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BHOPAL IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
HOW INDIAN VICTIMS FAILED TO GET JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES
Jayanth K. Krishnan*
ABSTRACT
Over thirty-five years ago, the city of Bhopal, India, witnessed
a horrific gas leak that originated from a facility operated by
Union Carbide India Limited (“UCIL”), which had as its parent
company the American-based Union Carbide Corporation
(“UCC”). Thousands were killed, with many more injured. One
hundred forty-five cases were filed throughout various U.S.
federal district courts on behalf of the victims asserting that
UCIL and UCC were liable. Eventually, these cases were
consolidated through the multi-district litigation (“MDL”)
process and placed onto the docket of federal Judge John Keenan.
In 1986, Judge Keenan issued his famous forum non conveniens
opinion, which stated that the Indian courts—and not the U.S.
federal judiciary—were the proper venue for hearing these
claims.
Between 1986 and 1993, Judge Keenan dismissed all of the
other MDL Bhopal cases he heard. Then, between 2000 and 2014
a set of distinct, non-MDL Bhopal matters appeared in front of
* Milt and Judi Stewart Professor of Law and Director of the Stewart Center on the
Global
Legal
Profession,
Indiana
University
Maurer
School
of
Law.
(Jkrishna@indiana.edu). The author is particularly indebted to Marc Galanter—who
published one of his first articles, befittingly, in the 1961 issue of the Rutgers Law Review,
on the rights of the needy in India—for his detailed comments and feedback on this project.
See Marc Galanter, Equality and “Productive Discrimination” in India, 16 RUTGERS L. REV.
42 (1961). The author received incredibly constructive and supportive insights from Vitor
Dias, Charles Geyh, Bert Kritzer, Ethan Michelson, Donna Nagy, Christiana Ochoa,
Austen Parrish, and Tung Yin. Ashley Ahlbrand provided invaluable research support, and
H.R. Sharma offered important historical background of the Bhopal litigation during the
2000s. The author is also grateful to Mitra Sharafi, the key visionary and architect of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison Bhopal Archive. Valuable comments on this Article were
also provided during workshops at the O.P. Jindal Global University (India), Indiana
University Maurer School of Law’s Graduate Colloquium, and Cornell Law School’s Berger
Center. For a classic book on efforts to “get justice,” see SALLY MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE,
GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990).
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Judge Keenan. In all of these too, he issued dismissals. Indeed,
the original MDL process—coupled with the existence of internal
federal courthouse rules—created a type of path dependence,
allowing for all of the Bhopal-Union Carbide matters to come
before Judge Keenan.
The thesis here is that following the MDL consolidation, Judge
Keenan became only more deeply wedded to the position he
staked out back in 1986. Subsequent, non-MDL Bhopal
plaintiffs, seeking an independent assessment of their claims,
found themselves tethered to the initial MDL decision from years
past. The broader lesson—beyond just this case study—is that in
order for deserving plaintiffs to receive a fresh review in federal
court, there needs to be an alternative imagination for how to
deal with later cases that, although seemingly connected, are
nevertheless distinct from the earlier MDL process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2019 marked thirty-five years since the world witnessed
what was then deemed to be the most devastating toxic tort disaster ever
seen. In December of 1984, the city of Bhopal, located in the central
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region of India, saw an Indian subsidiary owned by the American parent
company, Union Carbide, leak some thirty-two tons of methyl isocyanate
gasses that were supposed to be used for the production of insecticides.1
The gasses proceeded to spread steadily across the city.2 The cold winter
weather conditions trapped the fumes and suffocated large swaths of the
population, inevitably increasing the injuries and death toll to horrifying
levels.3 Although even to this day there remains no consensus on the
exact number of people that were killed––the figures run from
approximately 5,200 to 15,000 to 25,000––the damage of the Union
Carbide gas leak can be still felt.4 Of those who survived, estimates are
that over a half million residents were exposed to the gasses and continue
to live with various types of injuries as a consequence.5
The legal events following the Bhopal disaster have been welldocumented over the past three decades.6 Almost immediately, lawyers
from around India and abroad—namely the United States7—descended
1. See e.g., Neeraj Santoshi, Bhopal Disaster: So, How Many Died? 32 Years On, No
One Sure, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016, 10:30 IST), https://www.hindustantimes.com/
bhopal/bhopal-disaster-so-how-many-died-32-years-on-no-one-sure/story-luLN0QaTxHlu0
5RTGNHOoI.html. Also, in 2016, the University of Wisconsin-Madison established one of
the foremost digital archives on the Bhopal tragedy. Bhopal: Law, Accidents, and Disaster
in India, UNIV. WIS.: L. SCH. DIGITAL REPOSITORY, https://repository.law.wisc.edu/s/uwlaw/
page/bhopal-collection. Compiling over 3600 sources (much of which was donated by
Professor Marc Galanter), this website provides links and files that have documented the
Bhopal tragedy. Id. It contains over 3600 sources, including books, articles, newspapers,
other journalistic accounts, government reports, amici curiae, cases, and much more. Id.
2. Lisa Moscati Hawkes, Parens Patriae and the Union Carbide Case: The Disaster at
Bhopal Continues, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 181, 181 (1988).
3. See Apoorva Mandivilli, The World’s Worst Industrial Disaster Is Still Unfolding,
ATLANTIC (July 10, 2018) https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/the-worldsworst-industrial-disaster-is-still-unfolding/560726/.
4. See Santoshi, supra note 1.
5. See e.g., Prabhash K. Dutta, Bhopal Gas Tragedy: What Happened this Day 33
Years Ago that Killed Thousands?, INDIA TODAY (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.indiatoday.in/
india/story/bhopal-gas-tragedy-what-had-happened-this-day-33-years-ago-that-killed-thou
sands-1099247-2017-12-03.
6. For a range of important studies, see e.g., UPENDRA BAXI & AMITA DHANDA,
VALIANT VICTIMS AND LETHAL LITIGATION: THE BHOPAL CASE (1990); UPENDRA BAXI &
THOMAS PAUL, MASS DISASTERS AND MULTINATIONAL LIABILITY: THE BHOPAL CASE (1986);
JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL (1993); KIM
FORTUN, ADVOCACY AFTER BHOPAL: ENVIRONMENTALISM, DISASTER, AND NEW GLOBAL
ORDERS (2001); Armin Rosencranz et al., Legal and Political Repercussions in India, in
LEARNING FROM DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 45–62 (Sheila Jasanoff ed.,
1994); Upendra Baxi, Some Newly Emergent Geographies of Injustice: Boundaries and
Borders in International Law, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 15, 23–27 (2016); Marc
Galanter, Bhopal: 30 Years On, UNIV. WIS.: L. SCH. DIGITAL REPOSITORY (Oct. 16, 2014),
https://repository.law.wisc.edu/s/uwlaw/page/bhopal-2014; see also Bhopal: Law, Accidents,
and Disaster in India, supra note 1.
7. See Hawkes, supra note 2, at 181.
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upon Bhopal to see what services they could provide. A key issue upon
which they focused was whom to hold primarily liable: the Indian
subsidiary or the American parent company, Union Carbide.8 Questions
also arose as to what role the Indian government ought to play.9 And of
course, most importantly, there was the issue of how best to provide
remedies to the victims and their families.10
In the weeks that followed, intensive discussions occurred among
Indian government leaders and Indian and American plaintiffs’ lawyers.
These talks centered on whether a lawsuit on behalf of the victims should
be brought in India or in the United States.11 Ultimately, the decision
was made that because the Indian courts suffered from tremendous
backlogs as well as the fact that Indian law did not offer adequate mass
tort remedies, the American lawyers representing the Bhopal victims
would sue the parent company in the United States.12 Thereafter, “some
145 purported class actions [were] filed in federal district courts across
the United States.”13
On January 2, 1985––exactly one month after the gas leak occurred—
the American Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”)
transferred these class actions to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (“SDNY”), where they then “became the subject of a
consolidated complaint filed on June 28, 1985, before Judge John
Keenan.”14 Statutorily created in 1968, the JPML emerged as part of
Congress’ multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) program, which was
empowered to combine “civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact . . . pending in different districts, [to be] transferred to
any [one] district [court and thereafter a respective judge] for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”15 During this same
8. See infra text accompanying notes 39–41.
9. See infra text accompanying note 16.
10. See discussion infra Part II (discussing what happened in the immediate aftermath
of the Bhopal gas leak.).
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 53–56.
13. Bano Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 984 F.2d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1993).
For a discussion, at the time, of whether a parent company could be held liable, see Allin
C. Seward III, After Bhopal: Implications for Parent Company Liability, 21 INT’L LAW. 695,
705 (1987). For a recent paper on how tort law in India has been updated to include the
elimination of the public-private distinction and the adoption of the parens patriae and
absolute liability principles, see Arpita Gupta, Mass Tort Jurisprudence and Critical
Epistemologies of Risk: Dissolution of Public-Private Divide in the Indian Mass Tort Law,
40 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 227, 227 (2019).
14. See Bano Bi, 984 F.2d at 583.
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018); see also CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL:
THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 13 (2016). In the later part
of this paper, there is an extensive set of citations to the scholars who have been examining
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period, the Indian parliament passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act,
which permitted the government of India to serve as the representative
and trustee of the victims.16 Therefore, when the initial consolidated case
was filed before Judge Keenan, it was the Indian government that was
the party suing Union Carbide for injuring the victims in Bhopal.
In the spring of 1986, Judge Keenan issued his ruling.17 He dismissed
the plaintiffs’ case on forum non conveniens grounds and ruled that the
matter ought to be heard and handled by the Indian judiciary.18 Judge
Keenan’s holding, at the time, received great attention from scholars,
lawyers, and other observers. Yet, what has garnered much less scrutiny
over the years is how a number of the assumptions within the opinion, in
fact, lacked support then and, bluntly put, have not been able to stand
the test of time. Moreover, even less well-known is that following this
judgment, Judge Keenan issued an additional sixteen procedural rulings
between 1986 and 2014 involving the Bhopal disaster.19 In not one of
these decisions did the plaintiffs ultimately prevail.20

the MDL process, particularly to Professor Andrew Bradt who has been a leading light in
this field. See infra Part IV. Also, for many who study and follow the MDL process, the
history of the famous Agent Orange litigation involving, first, Judge George C. Pratt and,
subsequently, Judge Jack B. Weinstein is emblematic of this statute in action. For an
overview of how this litigation (and then settlement) played out, see Ralph Blumenthal,
How Judge Helped Shape Agent Orange Pact, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 1984), https://
www.nytimes.com/1984/05/11/nyregion/how-judge-helped-shape-agent-orange-pact.html;
see also PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC TORT DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 97 (1986); John C. Coffee Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1356–58 (1995); John C. Coffee Jr., Litigation Governance:
Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 319 (2010); Michael D.
Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992,
2054 (2012).
16. The official name of the law was the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of
Claims) Act March 29, 1985. Bano Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 984 F.2d
582, 583 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Oscar Omar Salazar-Duran, A Human Rights Approach to
Corporate Accountability and Environmental Litigation, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 733, 752 (2009).
17. In re Union Carbide Corp. Bhopal Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff’d as modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
18. Id. at 845.
19. See infra Part IV. These rulings spanned across five separate cases. One point that
is important to remember is that these cases can be categorized as those that followed along
the MDL, those that involved separate litigants who sued for damages based on the injuries
caused by the 1984 gas leak, and those that involved separate litigants who sued for
damages based on a lack of environmental remedial measures that Union Carbide had
promised to undertake.
20. As the subsequent sections will discuss, some of these rulings that were appealed
to the Second Circuit were remanded to Judge Keenan for further deliberation. However,
ultimately, in not one of these matters did the Second Circuit allow the claimants to proceed
with their claims—thereby siding with Judge Keenan’s orders to dismiss. For a supportive
piece of Judge Keenan’s 1986 ruling, see generally Hawkes, supra note 2.
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The argument of this Article has two aspects. First, there is an indepth analysis of what might be called the federal judiciary’s “Bhopal
Jurisprudence.”21 As will be suggested, as the years went on, Judge
Keenan’s rulings became increasingly more steadfast in terms of
dismissing the different plaintiffs’ claims that came before him. Even on
those rare occasions when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded
a matter for Judge Keenan to reconsider, his ultimate conclusion was to
find against the plaintiff’s side, which was not overturned by the
appellate court. Of course, such outcomes would be completely
understandable had each of these petitioners set forth weak cases or
provided little prima facie evidence that did not justify their claims
moving forward. However, in reality, the opposite occurred. The claims,
legal arguments, and actual evidence—particularly in those matters
during the 2000s—were strong and demonstrated that the plaintiffs
should have at least been allowed to have their cases heard at trial.
However, time after time, Judge Keenan issued judgments for the
defendants, dismissing the cases.
Offering a detailed evaluation of Judge Keenan’s Bhopal
jurisprudence might make for an interesting paper on its own. However,
the second part of this Article goes deeper, asking whether, upon
reflection, Judge Keenan should have been allowed to serve as the sole
judge for all of the Bhopal matters between 1986 and 2014. Recall that
the above-referenced MDL process consolidated into a single complaint
the 145 cases that were filed in 1985 and then brought them under Judge
Keenan’s authority.22 Subsequently, Judge Keenan issued his forum non
conveniens decision in 1986 as well as three other MDL rulings in 1989,
1992, and 1993, respectively.23
Starting in 2000, however, separate Bhopal cases, unrelated to the
MDL, were filed in federal court. Yet, Judge Keenan remained as the only
district court judge to hear these matters. Why? One might think that
21. This term has been used in the past by scholars. See e.g., UPENDRA BAXI, THE
BHOPAL VICTIMS IN THE LABYRINTH OF THE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, at lxviii (1990); Nehal
Patel & Ksenia Petlakh, Gandhi’s Nightmare: Bhopal and the Need for a Mindful
Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 151, 153, 158, 170–71, 184, 190 (2014).
Additionally the blog, Law and Other Things, which focuses on law in South Asia,
particularly India, has used this term in the past. Vasujith Ram, Bhopal: Law, Accidents
and Disaster, A Digital Archive Initiated by Marc Galanter, LAW & OTHER THINGS (Nov. 2,
2016, 9:40 AM), https://lawandotherthings.com/2016/11/bhopal-law-accidents-and-disas
ter/.
22. Bano Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 984 F.2d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1993).
23. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, No. M21-38 (JFK), 1993 WL
541230 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, No. MDL
626, 1992 WL 36135 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1992); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster
at Bhopal, No. 21-38 (JFK), 1989 WL 66673 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1989).
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these later cases would go through what is typically called the “random
assignment”24 process. However, as Professor Katherine Macfarlane has
summarized, within the federal district court of the SDNY, the
assignment system was also accompanied by the “related cases” rule,
which has “allow[ed] judges to ‘accept’ later-filed cases if they [were]
related to an earlier-filed case already on their docket.”25 Professor
Macfarlane notes that traditionally “[t]he decision to accept or reject the
newly-filed case . . . [was] within the ‘sole discretion’ of the judge.”26 Thus,
a typical process might involve a plaintiff filing a case in federal court,
which would first be randomly assigned to a judge by court staff. The
defendant would then move to have that case transferred to a judge who
had heard a “related case” in the past. The latter judge could then
exclusively decide whether or not to take it.27
Because of ongoing worries that moving parties, in such situations,
were seeking to transfer cases to judges perceived to be more favorable
to them, in 2013 the SDNY implemented certain changes to its related
cases rule.28 Today, a committee comprising “the chief judge and two
other active judges” evaluate and can reject the request made by a party
to transfer the case to a related case judge.29 And simply because the legal
issues or parties may be the same as a previous case does not necessarily
mean that the two cases will be deemed as related any longer.30
The purpose of the updated rules was to minimize how parties might
game the assignment system as well as to reduce the unchecked power
federal judges were amassing with respect to particular areas of law.31
24. See Katherine Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the
Southern District of New York’s ‘Related Cases’ Rule Has Shaped the Evolution of Stop-andFrisk Law, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L.199, 205 (2014).
25. Id. at 203.
26. Id.
27. This example draws on lessons provided by Professor Macfarlane. Id. at 222–23.
Professor Macfarlane’s work focuses on how the well-documented series of “stop-and-frisk”
cases continually appeared on the docket of Southern District of New York Judge Shira
Scheindlin, who, over the years, ruled against this policy. Id. at 220–25. Eventually, the
Second Circuit publicly rebuked Judge Scheindlin on grounds of failing to be impartial and
then removed her from hearing future such matters. Id. at 204–05, 242–46.
28. Id. at 245.
29. S.D.N.Y. L.R. 2; see also E.D.N.Y. L.R. 2; Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 245–46.
Note, the 2018 rules are an updated version of the rules that were amended in 2013.
30. S.D.N.Y. L.R. 2; see also E.D.N.Y. L.R. 2; Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 245–46.
31. Professor Macfarlane cites to an essay written by Benjamin Weiser & Joseph
Goldstein, which quotes Chief Judge Loretta Preska discussing the importance of
transparency and her desire to reduce the influence that one judge can have over the law.
Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 245–46 (citing Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Federal
Court Alters Rules on Judge Assignments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/nyregion/federal-court-alters-rules-on-judge-assignments.ht
ml).
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While Professor Macfarlane was writing on Section 1983 cases,32 her
analysis is relevant to the mass tort context here as well—with an added
layer offered. As she astutely notes—and rightly worries about—these
updated rules have an exemption for federal judges who assume senior
status.33 As Rule 15 states: “A senior judge may keep as much of his or
her existing docket as that judge desires and furnish the assignment
committee with a list of all cases which the judge desires to have
transferred.”34
In 1996, Judge Keenan earned senior status.35 Even if the latest rules
were in effect then, he would have been exempt. The initial MDL process
that led to Judge Keenan being selected as the consolidating judge in
1985 paved the way for him to hear subsequent non-MDL matters on
Bhopal between 2000 and 2014. Otherwise put, path dependence—or the
idea that historical decisions “lock-in”36 future events that may or may
not be optimal for the greater good—appears to have occurred in this
situation. The result was that one judge was able to shape and influence
the outcomes of a series of cases for nearly thirty years. Moreover, the
continued presence of the senior status exemption means that there is
nothing to stop this type of situation from occurring again in the future.
From a normative perspective, such a process runs deeply counter to the
interests of public policy and has serious implications for how we ought
to be thinking about issues connected to corporate accountability,
victims’ rights, and broader notions of due process and social justice.
This Article will proceed in the following manner. Part II will analyze
the Bhopal-MDL cases of 1986, 1989, 1992, and 1993. Part III will then
move to examine the set of non-MDL Bhopal matters that came before
Judge Keenan beginning in 2000. This discussion will also include the
role that the Second Circuit played at various points when it was asked
to intervene on appeal.
Part IV will address how and why all of these Bhopal matters could
appear in front of the same judge over the past three decades.
Furthermore, this Part asks whether the “funneling” of cases into one
judge’s docket is a normatively positive aspect of our civil procedure
system. There will be a presentation and evaluation of different points of
view, including a strong critique of the oft-given argument that the
current process provides litigants with an “expert adjudicator” who is
32. See Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 215–25.
33. Id. at 246.
34. See S.D.N.Y. L.R. 15; see also E.D.N.Y. L.R. 15; Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 246.
35. See Keenan, John Fontaine, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
keenan-john-fontaine (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
36. See Brian W. Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 117 (1989).

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

SPRING 2020

2020] HOW INDIAN VICTIMS FAILED TO GET JUSTICE 713
specialized, greatly knowledgeable, and judicially efficient. Upon
surmising that the status quo, in fact, does a disservice to victims such
as those from the Bhopal disaster, this Article will then move to Part V,
the Conclusion. Recognizing that judicial economy advocates will remain
interested in having cases continue to move expeditiously through the
federal courts, there is nevertheless a call to return to a more randomized
selection of judges in situations like these, so that plaintiffs seeking
justice can better have their voices heard.37
II. THE FIRST MAJOR BHOPAL CASE AND ITS MDL PROGENY
A. The 1986 Forum Non Conveniens Decision
1.

Battle of the Experts

As stated above, in 1985 the JPML channeled the array of cases that
had been filed by the Bhopal plaintiffs’ lawyers into Judge Keenan’s
docket as a single consolidated matter.38 During that year and the early
part of 1986, the Indian government and Union Carbide wrestled over
whether the case ought to be heard in the United States or India. The
manner in which the parties’ interests aligned were unusual, to say the
least. On the one side, lawyers from Minneapolis, New York, and
Cincinnati represented the Indian government.39 They argued that the
U.S. courts were the proper forum for adjudication because Union
Carbide was headquartered and incorporated in United States and top
executives resided within the country.40 On the other side, the law firm
of Kelley Drye & Warren represented Union Carbide, which contended
that the dispute was best resolved within India because that is where the
gas spill had occurred.41
Judge Keenan clearly understood the gravity of the matter, as
indicated by his sobering opening sentence, which reiterated that “[o]n
the night of December 2–3, 1984 the most tragic industrial disaster in
37. In making this argument, this Part will draw particularly upon Macfarlane, supra
note 24.
38. For the case history on this point, see Bano Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics
Co., 984 F.2d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1993).
39. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Bhopal Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 843
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that the firms were Robins, Zelle, Larson & Kaplan (Minneapolis),
Barrett, Smith, Schapiro, Simon & Armstrong (New York), and Waite, Schneider, Bayless
& Chesley Co. (Cincinnati); Hoffinger, Friedland, Dorbish, Bernfeld & Hasen (New York)
served as liaison counsel).
40. Id. at 855.
41. Id. at 861. Note that the Christic Institute of Washington D.C. served as of counsel
for an amicus curiae. Id. at 843.
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history occurred in the city of Bhopal, state of Madhya Pradesh, Union of
India.”42 His opinion was twenty-six pages and assessed the different
arguments presented by each side. Before evaluating these issues,
however, Judge Keenan did not hesitate to express his dismay at the
behavior of various members of the American bar who had “travelled the
8,200 miles to Bhopal in those months” after the gas leak to sign up
Indian plaintiffs that “did little to better the American image in the Third
World—or anywhere else.”43 Although he hastened to note that none of
the plaintiffs’ lawyers in this particular case were involved in such
actions, Judge Keenan’s affirmative inclusion of this point, right on page
one, footnote one, could be interpreted as setting the stage of what was
to come within the substance of the judgment.
The main issue that Union Carbide sought to have adjudicated
centered on its argument that the courts in India were the more
appropriate and convenient forums to hear this case.44 Union Carbide
cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s Piper Aircraft Company v. Reynolds
judgment for support, which Judge Keenan agreed was directly on
point.45 According to the plaintiffs, there were more applicable lower
court cases, but Judge Keenan held that Piper Aircraft, as well as a
preceding Supreme Court ruling in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, were
the “touchstones” for deciding this case.46 As Piper Aircraft set forth, in
order for a district court to rule in favor of a forum non conveniens
petition, it had to determine whether the alternate venue was “adequate”
and whether, upon balancing “relevant public and private interest
factors,” justice would be served.47 Additionally, Judge Keenan, in
referencing Piper Aircraft, noted that it mattered greatly if the plaintiffs
were from the United States or abroad because, if it was the former, there
would be greater deference given to where the plaintiffs wished to litigate
compared to if they were foreign.48

42. Id. at 844.
43. Id. at 844 n.1. Note, this observation of Judge Keenan’s remark was made years
back in Marc Galanter, The Transnational Traffic in Legal Remedies, in LEARNING FROM
DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 133–57, 147 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994)
(referring to this event as “the great ambulance chase”); Alan Reed, To Be or Not to Be: The
Forum Non Conveniens Performance Acted Out on Anglo-American Courtroom Stages, 29
GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 31, 72–73 (2000); Patrick M. Hanlon & Matthew M. Hoffman,
Availability of U.S. Courts for Asbestos Actions Arising out of Non-U.S. Exposures, SG057
ALI-ABA 33, at 41–42 (2001).
44. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 845.
45. Id. (citing 454 U.S. 235 (1981)).
46. Id. (citing 330 U.S. 501 (1947)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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In reviewing these elements, Judge Keenan started with the question
of whether the Indian courts would be equipped to handle this case.49 For
the plaintiffs, the answer was a resounding no. India’s tort law system
was underdeveloped, its judiciary was severely backlogged and slow to
deliver remedies, and litigants had tremendous difficulty accessing legal
services.50 Furthermore, within the courts themselves, there existed
onerous bureaucratic hurdles that inhibited claimants from wanting to
bring their cases in the first place.51 Professor Marc Galanter, from the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, who has long been one of the world’s
leading scholars on Indian law, was hired as an expert witness to support
these arguments made by the plaintiffs.52
In his 221-page affidavit, Professor Galanter did not hold back on his
views that it would be a denial of justice if the case were transferred from
the SDNY to India.53 For Professor Galanter, the history of British
colonialism in India had resulted in a mismatch whereby a foreign power
had placed onto its colony a legal system that did not meet the needs of
its citizens.54 Inordinate delay, a lack of familiarity with complex tort
cases by judges, and a legal profession that had insufficient resources,
expertise, and background on litigating tort matters all were enormous
obstacles for the Bhopal plaintiffs.55 Add to these obstacles that the
Indian courts simply did not have the necessary infrastructure,
technology, and investigative tools that were crucial to hearing such a
massive, complicated case.56

49. Id. at 847.
50. Id. at 847–48.
51. See id. at 847.
52. Id. For background on Professor Galanter, see Marc Galanter, U. WIS.-MADISON,
https://secure.law.wisc.edu/profiles/msgalant@wisc.edu (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). See also
About Professor Marc Galanter’s Involvement in Bhopal, U. WIS. L. SCH. DIGITAL REPOSITORY, https://repository.law.wisc.edu/s/uwlaw/page/about-marc-galanter (last visited
Jan. 29, 2020). For a discussion of Professor Galanter’s role in this case, see Sheila Jasanoff,
Bhopal’s Trials of Knowledge and Ignorance, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 101, 105 (2008).
53. See Affidavit of Marc S. Galanter at 199, In re Union Carbide Corp. Bhopal Gas
Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (No. 626). For a series of more recent
works confirming that the court system in India suffers from numerous issues that result
in a denial of justice to everyday litigants, see Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Bread
for the Poor: Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789,
789–91 (2004); Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., Grappling at the Grassroots: Access to Justice
in India’s Lower Tier, 27 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 151, 152–54 (2014); Jayanth K. Krishnan &
Patrick W. Thomas, Surveying Key Aspects of Socio-Legal Scholarship on India: An
Overview, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 337, 352 (2015).
54. See Affidavit of Marc S. Galanter, supra note 53, at 169–70.
55. Id. at 172–79.
56. Id. at 183–85.
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Finally, according to Professor Galanter, the procedural rules in
India were archaic and unfairly disadvantaged parties such as the
Bhopal victims. Indian law, for example, did not provide for class action
suits for toxic tort cases.57 Discovery was also notably restricted.58
Moreover, defendants could easily employ stalling tactics, such as filing
large numbers of interlocutory appeals.59 And plaintiffs were precluded
from impleading third-party defendants into civil suits.60
It is important to note that Professor Galanter’s affidavit was based
not just on his years of experience in India, but also, quite significantly,
on the work of Indian lawyers and scholars whom he repeatedly cited.61
Nevertheless, Judge Keenan opted to disregard his analysis, noting that
Professor Galanter’s “opinions concerning the Indian legal system, its
judiciary and the bar are far less persuasive”62 because he was never
“admitted to practice in India.”63 Instead, Judge Keenan pointed to two
experts that Union Carbide had hired¾N.A. Palkhivala and J.B.
Dadachanji, “each of whom had been admitted to practice in India for
over 40 years” and “[b]oth [of whom] are Senior Advocates before the
Supreme Court of India.”64 Palkhivala and Dadachanji argued that India
could indeed handle this type of litigation and that its courts were
prepared and that Indian judges were ready to deliver justice in a timely
and innovative fashion.65 There were other cases that, while not as big,
showed the Indian judiciary to be acting prudently, fairly, and quickly.66
Moreover, Palkhivala and Dadachanji rejected the idea that the
Indian courts lacked the necessary infrastructure or technological
capacity or that there were insufficient numbers of legal professionals to
assist those in need. After all, given that the Indian government had
stepped in, the entire power of the state now was behind the victims,
which meant that all conceivable resources and talent could be

57. Id. at 192–93.
58. Id. at 187–89.
59. Id. at 173–75.
60. Id. at 195.
61. Id. at 170, 172, 175, 180, 201 (noting references to works by Professor Upendra Baxi
and Professor M.P. Jain); see, e.g., UPENDRA BAXI , THE CRISIS OF THE INDIAN LEGAL
SYSTEM (1982); M.P. JAIN, OUTLINES OF INDIAN LEGAL HISTORY (4th ed., 1981); Upendra
Baxi & Marc Galanter, Panchayat Justice: An Indian Experiment in Legal Access, in 3
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 341–86 (Mauro Cappelletti &
Bryant Garth eds., 1979).
62. In re Union Carbide Corp. Bhopal Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 847
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 848–49.
66. Id. at 848–50.
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marshalled on their behalf.67 Additionally, Palkhivala and Dadachanji
denied that Indian tort law was as incomplete and nascent as Professor
Galanter had argued. They stated that it was more codified than found
in Indian common law and that, because of the high rates of tort-based
settlements that occurred within the country, there were simply fewer
official judgments issued by the Indian courts.68 And then procedurally,
they rebutted the notion that third parties could not be impleaded; that
was simply wrong, they asserted, as indicated by Rule 10(2) and section
151 of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure.69
Upon reviewing these testimonials, Judge Keenan found Union
Carbide’s experts to be more convincing than the plaintiffs’ experts. He
concluded that the Indian courts could adjudicate the Bhopal gas leak
dispute in an adequate fashion, per the standard set forth in Piper
Aircraft and Gilbert. His analysis did not end there, however, as this
discussion next explains.
2.

Judge Keenan’s Evaluation of the Evidence

The second part of Judge Keenan’s opinion dealt with another crucial
issue raised in both Gilbert and Piper Aircraft—namely, ensuring that
the “private interests”70 of the competing parties would be safeguarded.
Specifically, what this meant, according to the judge, was that he was
obliged to determine whether the American courts or the Indian courts
would be the best venue to evaluate the different pieces of evidence that
each side would likely proffer in order to make their case. Judge Keenan
began this task by addressing Union Carbide’s argument that “virtually
all of the evidence [that] will be relevant at trial in this case . . . [was]
67. Id. at 849.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 850 (noting that Rule 10(2) “allows the court to add additional parties if the
presence of those parties is ‘necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and
completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit’”). Dadachanji’s
affidavit also notes that section 151 would allow for impleading third parties in the interests
of justice. Id. at 850–51. Two additional rebuttal points that Union Carbide’s experts made
were in regards to Professor Galanter’s concerns over not having juries to decide this case
and not having a legal professional who worked under a contingency fee model, which
Professor Galanter believed, respectively, would likely hurt the chances of the victims being
able to redress their grievances fully (and being compensated accordingly) and deprive them
of access to lawyers who might want to help but who could not because of the prohibition
on contingency fees. Id. at 851. Union Carbide’s experts flatly rejected these arguments,
noting first that civil law countries do not have juries (nor does Britain) for civil cases, and
tort disputes are adjudicated perfectly well in these contexts. Id. Second, the experts noted
that contingency fees are primarily an American phenomenon and that lawyers in other
jurisdictions do just fine in serving tort-based clients with their claims. Id. at 851–52.
70. Id. at 852.
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located in India.”71 For example, plant records, plant personnel, and the
plant itself—which had seven separate facilities—were all there.72
Moreover, Union Carbide’s position was that its Indian subsidiary
employees were the individuals that needed to be interviewed,
investigated, and potentially held to account—not the U.S. parent
company or its American employees.73 The reason was simple: “[T]he
Bhopal plant was managed and operated entirely by Indian nationals,
who were employed by [Union Carbide India Limited (“UCIL”)].”74
For the plaintiffs, the linkages between the parent company and
UCIL were intertwined, so much so that it made only logical sense for
the evidence to be evaluated by U.S. courts. Consider that safety
inspections on the Bhopal plant had been done by American Union
Carbide supervisors. Because there had been two earlier plant accidents,
the plaintiffs believed they deserved an opportunity—in an American
court—to show how there was a connection between the parent
corporation and the subsidiary.75
It was also crucial that the plaintiffs be able to depose and crossexamine these officials under American rules of evidence. Additionally,
the plaintiffs argued that they could show that the design of the Bhopal
facility was directly tied to plans set forth by Union Carbide’s American
technicians.76 And the plaintiffs rejected the idea that an effective trial
could not take place in the United States just because the plant was
located in India.77 In most major toxic tort and product liability cases,
they contended, “videotapes, pictures, diagrams, schematics and models
are [known to be] more instructive than actual view.”78
In determining the issue of how best to balance the private interests
of both sides, Judge Keenan ultimately came down in favor of Union
Carbide. He provided several reasons why he felt this was the most just
outcome. Given that the victims and virtually all the evidence were
located in India, the transportation of these individuals and other
“sources of proof” to the United States made little sense.79 Conversely,
asking the handful of Union Carbide officials from the United States to
travel to India to testify, if needed, would be both easier and cheaper.80
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 853–54.
Id. at 852.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 854–56.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 860.
Id.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 859.
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Relatedly, and critically, because the Indian government had taken
over as the representative of the plaintiffs’ interests, it only made sense
for the case to be in India, since these public officials were located in the
country. As Judge Keenan held, there was a fairness and due process
component to this analysis as well; were the case to be held in the United
States, then many of these witnesses and pieces of evidence likely would
not make it out of India, thereby depriving the defense from evaluating
and adequately confronting their accusers.81
In addition to these “private interest concerns,” Judge Keenan also
addressed a set of “public interest” factors that needed to be taken into
account, per the Supreme Court’s Gilbert ruling.82 For example, he raised
the issue of how hearing the case in the SDNY would cause enormous
logistical burdens on the court’s resources, staff, and infrastructure.
Finding jurors would also be difficult, and there would be the constant
hassle and worry of ensuring proper translation from the Indian
language of Hindi to English, whenever witnesses so needed it.83 Then
there were the financial costs that would be imposed on American
taxpayers.84 While precise dollar amounts could not be estimated, Judge
Keenan projected that the expenses of hosting the litigation in New York
would be disproportionately higher than if the case were heard in India.85
And finally, Judge Keenan concluded upon a simple point—the
appropriate law to apply was Indian law.86 The accident occurred in
India; the number of “contacts” who were affected by the disaster were
far more in India than in the United States; India’s stake in this case was
paramount; and, as such, an Indian court was most suitably equipped to
handle and apply Indian law to the case itself.87 Because of his belief that
the Indian legal system could handle this litigation in an appropriate
fashion and that justice would be upended if he were to hold otherwise,
he stated that “[i]t would be sadly paternalistic, if not misguided,” for the
case to proceed in the United States.88
Therefore, in sum, Judge Keenan dismissed the plaintiff’s case on
forum non conveniens grounds. As part of his order, the judge required
that Union Carbide waive any statute of limitations defense it might
81. Id. (“While Union Carbide might be deprived of testimony of witnesses or even
potential third-parties if this action were to proceed in this [U.S.] forum, no such problem
would exist if the litigation went forward in India.”).
82. Id. at 852, 860.
83. Id. at 862
84. Id. at 867.
85. Id. at 862.
86. Id. at 866.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 864.
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make, as well as agree to abide by any judgment reached by an Indian
court.89 Interestingly, there was one other condition to which the
company had to adhere. The last sentence of the opinion ended by
mandating that “Union Carbide shall be subject to discovery under the
model of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after
appropriate demand by plaintiffs.”90
In the following years, subsequent cases that fell under the MDL
umbrella came in front of Judge Keenan. The next Section evaluates his
rulings in each of these.
B. The Remaining MDL Cases
On February 14, 1989, an agreement was reached between the
Government of India and Union Carbide stating that the latter would
pay $470 million to settle all outstanding claims being made by the
plaintiffs.91 The Supreme Court of India gave its approval to this
settlement. The money was to be paid to the Indian government, which
in turn would disburse the sums to the victims of the Bhopal disaster.92
This settlement was related to the just-discussed, initial MDL.
Thereafter, three of the American lawyers representing the victims and
the Indian government—F. Lee Bailey, Stanley Chesley, and Lionel
Marks—sought to recoup their fees from the settlement that had been
brokered.93 They approached Judge Keenan in 1989 in hopes that a
portion would be set aside to cover the costs they had incurred.94

89. Id. at 867.
90. Id. Although she does not discuss Bhopal/Union Carbide or this decision by Judge
Keenan, see generally Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
390, 395–98 (2017) (noting the ills that have arisen as a result of judges employing this
doctrine).
91. For a discussion of this point, see A Bhopal Timeline, UNIV. WIS. L. SCH. DIG.
REPOSITORY, https://repository.law.wisc.edu/s/uwlaw/page/a-bhopal-timeline (last visited
Feb. 17, 2020). See also N.Y. Federal Court Dismisses Bhopal Suit, Finds Union Carbide
Met Obligations, 10 ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 13 (2003); Mary Elliott Rolle,
Unraveling Accountability: Contesting Legal and Procedural Barriers in International Toxic
Tort Cases, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 168 (2003). For an interesting discussion of
what transpired at the lower level court in Bhopal and then on appeal in the Madhya
Pradesh High Court, after Judge Keenan’s 1986 dismissal, see Rhonda Wasserman, Equity
Transformed: Preliminary Injunctions to Require the Payment of Money, 70 B.U. L. REV.
623, 684–87 (1990).
92. A Bhopal Timeline, supra note 91; N.Y. Federal Court Dismisses Bhopal Suit, Finds
Union Carbide Met Obligations, supra note 91; Rolle, supra note 91; Wasserman, supra
note 91.
93. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, No. 21-38 (JFK), 1989
WL 66673, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1989).
94. Id. at 1.
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Unlike in his 1986 ruling where he skeptically viewed the motives of
many of the American lawyers who traveled to Bhopal, Judge Keenan
praised the ethics and values of Bailey, Chesley, and Marks in this 1989
case.95 However, he ruled that his earlier judgment, which was upheld by
the Second Circuit, precluded the lawyers from seeking relief in U.S.
courts.96 If these lawyers wanted to pursue their claims for feereimbursement, they had to do so within the Indian judiciary. As such,
the case was dismissed.97
In 1992, another MDL matter was brought to Judge Keenan. This
case originally was filed in Texas by lawyers for a class of plaintiffs who
wanted their claims heard in state court.98 The lawyers argued that since
Union Carbide had begun its chemical production operations in Texas as
early as 1941, and continued to maintain a presence there, the state
courts had jurisdiction to hear the case.99 Union Carbide, however, was
able to remove the litigation to a federal court within Texas. From there,
the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation intervened, much to
the objection of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, and subsequently assigned the
case to the federal district court of the SDNY, with Judge Keenan
presiding.100
The plaintiffs were keen on litigating this case in the Texas state
courts because of their belief that, under Texas law, the defendants would
have a more difficult time prevailing on a forum non conveniens
motion.101 Without much explanation, other than noting that this was a
“diversity action” that required him to “apply federal forum non
conveniens law to the issue of the convenience of this forum,” Judge
Keenan brushed aside this argument.102
The plaintiffs then put forth a theory stating that even under his own
1986 ruling, Judge Keenan had to allow them to move forward with this
case. After six years of trying to pursue their claims in India, the
plaintiffs stated that the judiciary there was not properly handling the
complexities of the matters before it. The alternative forum was not
95. Id. at 2 (“At each stage of the litigation in the United States they demonstrated
professionalism and a genuine concern for the victims and their families. Their conduct
insured that those who suffered loss receive fair and careful representation here in the
United States Courts.”).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, No. MDL 626, 1992 WL 36135,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1992).
99. For a history of the Union Carbide Corporation, see History, UNION CARBIDE CORP.,
http://www.unioncarbide.com/History.
100. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 1992 WL 36135, at *2.
101. Id. at *3.
102. Id.
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comparable. Delay persisted with the courts, and, moreover, the $470
million settlement that had been reached was woefully inadequate to
meet the needs of the victims and, in reality, had only come about
through “unfair and coercive means.”103 Finally, as a response to the
logistical burdens of trying the case in an American court, the plaintiffs’
lawyers offered to cover all of the expenses of those injured who needed
to travel from India to the United States “for depositions and medical
examinations.”104 They were even willing to pay for the costs to depose
those defendants who were located overseas.105
Nevertheless, Judge Keenan refused to accept these arguments as
well. Perhaps more troubling, rather than offering a substantive
rebuttal, he simply referenced his 1986 opinion as the benchmark for why
he would not let this case proceed. For Judge Keenan, so long as the
judiciary and Parliament of India continued to believe that the plaintiffs
could receive timely and adequate justice in the Indian courts, he had no
reason to question this conclusion.106 That he described the plaintiffs’
positions, early in his opinion, as “a thicket of arguments, some of which
would be labeled imaginative by a kind or charitable observer,”107 no
doubt sealed the claimants’ fate as to what the outcome in this case would
be.108
The final MDL case that Judge Keenan heard was a year later (1993)
and involved a rehearing of the attorneys’ fees matter from 1989.
Following that 1989 decision, the Second Circuit took the matter up on
appeal. The appellate court affirmed Judge Keenan’s decision, ruling that
he had no jurisdiction to allocate any part of the $470 million settlement
towards fees for the plaintiffs’ lawyers.109 The lawyers’ best chance would
be to pursue their claims within the Indian judiciary.110
Thereafter, the plaintiffs’ lawyers asked the Indian Supreme Court
to consider whether they could stake a claim from the settlement amount.
They even sought to place a lien on that portion that would equal the

103. Id. at *4.
104. Id. at *4.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *3.
108. Note in 1993, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Keenan’s opinion and went one
step further, declaring that the plaintiffs simply had no standing because of the Indian
government’s passage of the Bhopal Act, which nullified any other party, except for the
Indian government, to represent the interests of those who were injured or had died. Bi v.
Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 984 F.2d 582, 585 (2d Cir. 1993).
109. See Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 61-62, 68 (2d Cir. 1991).
110. See id. at 68.
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percentage they said they were owed.111 Their request was denied by the
Indian Court on the ground that it was entered too late and that it should
have been proffered during the discussions that the Indian government
was having with Union Carbide or as the judicial proceeding was
reviewing the settlement.112 As a result, the lawyers reappeared in Judge
Keenan’s court in 1993, seeking to pursue a claim against Union Carbide
under section 475 of the New York Judiciary Law, which permitted
lawyers to issue a lien on property in expectation of fee payments.113
Judge Keenan, given his earlier judgment, perhaps not surprisingly
was unsympathetic. He first held that the New York law only applied to
a limited set of circumstances, of which this Bhopal matter was not
one.114 He then criticized the lawyers (whom he had praised in the 1989
case) now for being lackadaisical. They could have been timely in their
filings in India—they were not.115 They had enlisted their clients in India
by using American contingency fee agreements, but they did not do their
due diligence to learn whether such arrangements were legal under
Indian regulations—they were not.116 As a last resort, they were now
seeking a “deep pocket” defendant—Union Carbide—to pay for their fees,
which the corporation had no obligation to do, according to the judge.117
As such, he had little difficulty dismissing the case.118
With this last 1993 judgment, the MDL came to an end. To recap, the
MDL began with the seminal 1986 forum non conveniens ruling, followed
by the MDL cases in 1989, 1992, and 1993. In all of these decisions, Judge
Keenan ruled against the claimants or the claimants’ lawyers and in
favor of Union Carbide.119 Starting in 2000, a series of new Bhopal-based

111. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, No. M21-38 (JFK), 1993 WL 541230,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993).
112. Id.
113. Id. According to Judge Keenan, in going only against Union Carbide, the lawyers
were “heeding the Chesley court’s observation that any claims against UOI would likely be
precluded by considerations of comity and sovereign immunity.” Id. (citing Chelsey, 927
F.2d at 67 n.4). The New York law still allows for this petition today. See N.Y. JUD. § 475
(McKinney 2019).
114. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 1993 WL 541230, at *3–4.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *5.
119. It should be noted that after the 1986 decision, the Second Circuit reviewed Judge
Keenan’s opinion and affirmed—but also “modified”—it as well. See In re Union Carbide
Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809 F.2d 195, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1987). The appellate
court held that Judge Keenan’s rulings that Union Carbide be required to “consent to the
enforcement of a final Indian judgment,” as well as obliging the company to adhere to
American discovery rules while litigating this case in India, were both in error. Id. at 205.
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judgments—that were not MDL-related—emerged from Judge Keenan’s
court. The next Part examines these rulings and the influence that the
earlier cases had on these later outcomes.
III. THE NON-MDL, BHOPAL-RELATED CASES
Starting in 2000, the federal courts—namely, Judge Keenan’s court
and, on occasion, the Second Circuit—issued a combined sixteen rulings
that related to the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal. These rulings
involved two main cases, Sajida Bano et al. v. Union Carbide and Warren
Anderson120 that went from 2000–05 and Janki Sahu et al. v. Union
Carbide and Warren Anderson, which lasted from 2005–13.121 As
explained below, neither of these cases were MDL matters and thus, in
theory, the plaintiffs’ claims should have stood or fallen on their own,
independent merits.
A. The Sajida Bano Case
In 2000, Judge Keenan heard a case involving a group of “survivors
and next-of-kin of victims of the Bhopal Gas Plant disaster of December
2–3, 1984.”122 It is important to note the history: the plaintiffs were part
of the class that brought their set of complaints to Judge Keenan back in
1992. Recall that case was part of the MDL, which was dismissed. Seven
years then passed and, as Judge Keenan described, a reconstituted group
of claimants filed a new case with new legal claims in a single district
against Union Carbide and its Chief Executive Officer, Warren
Anderson.123
Thus, the 2000 Sajida Bano case was not part of the MDL from the
1990s. Nevertheless, it was on Judge Keenan’s docket, and he presided
over the matter for the next five years as it went through an appeal and
then remand, followed by another appeal and then a second remand. The
essence of the case was straightforward. Sajida Bano, together with a
The Second Circuit’s decision, thus, gave Union Carbide an even bigger win than Judge
Keenan’s original decision. For a further discussion, see Rolle, supra note 91, at 164–65.
120. No. 99 Civ. 11329 (JFK), 2000 WL 1225789, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2000), aff’d in
part, vacated in part Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001).
121. 418 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Note, as will be discussed, there were
subsequent related cases that came to be known as Sahu II and Sahu III. See infra Section
III.B. Also, Judge Keenan’s ruling in 2012 was his last one on this case, and it was affirmed
by the Second Circuit in 2013. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 528 F. App’x 96 (2d Cir.
2013).
122. See Bano, 2000 WL 1225789, at *1.
123. Id. at *5. Note, some members from the original 1992 case did participate in this
later case.
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class of other plaintiffs, sought to bring multiple causes of action against
Union Carbide and its then-CEO Anderson under the Alien Tort Claims
Act (“ATCA”).124 The thrust of the ATCA grievances revolved around the
plaintiffs’ assertions that the company and Anderson had committed
egregious human rights violations in how they operated the facility,
which caused injury, death, and destruction to the thousands of victims
in Bhopal.125 In addition, they brought a series of nuisance,
environmental degradation, fraud, and property complaints as part of
their petition.126
In a sharp rebuke to the plaintiffs, Judge Keenan granted the
defendants’ motions to dismiss for failing to state a claim as well as
summary judgment.127 According to Judge Keenan, the plaintiffs had no
standing to sue. The Indian Parliament’s passage of the Bhopal Act
necessarily precluded Sajida Bano and the others from proceeding with
this suit.128 Judge Keenan pointed to the Indian Supreme Court’s 1990
decision, Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, upholding the
constitutionality of the statute, as support for the finding that only “the
Indian Government had exclusive authority to represent the victims.”129
Given the outcome of Lal Sahu, Judge Keenan then proceeded to hold
that the Indian government had the sole and absolute power to negotiate
a civil settlement with Union Carbide for the $470 million that was
reached.130 As Judge Keenan stated, because the various ATCA causes of
action being pursued here were civil in nature, and thus fell under the
umbrella of the settlement, the current plaintiffs were collaterally
estopped from moving forward with their case.131
124. Id. The specifics of the claims were listed by Judge Keenan as follows: “(1) Violations
of international criminal law under the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350;
(2) Racial discrimination in violation of international law under the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. §
1350; (3) Cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; (4)
Violation of the rights to li[f]e, health, and security of the person under the ATCA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350; (5) Violations of international environmental rights under the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. §
1350; (6) A consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights under the ATCA, 28
U.S.C. § 1350.”
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *15.
128. Id. at *10–12.
129. Id. at *3 (citing (1990) 1989 SC 639 (India)).
130. Id. at *12.
131. Id. at *13. Note that as part of their case, the plaintiffs had argued that Union
Carbide’s criminal activity, which had been investigated by the Indian Government,
provided them with an avenue to pursue—separately—their various civil claims and their
ATCA causes of action within the American federal courts. Id. The plaintiffs also argued
that the “Defendants’ motions [to dismiss and for summary judgment should be ignored by
Judge Keenan] on the basis of the ‘fugitive disentitlement doctrine.’” Id. at *6. Essentially,
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One year later, the Second Circuit heard this case on appeal.132 It
affirmed Judge Keenan’s central holdings, save one.133 At the district
court level, the plaintiffs had argued that they ought to be able to sue the
defendants on a number of common law environmental violations that
were not tied to the 1984 disaster.134 According to the Second Circuit,
Judge Keenan too summarily dismissed this complaint without providing
adequate explanation and, as such, remanded on this point.135 However,
as the court stated, “We are nonetheless confident, particularly in light
of Judge Keenan’s extensive and intimate familiarity with the Bhopal
disaster litigation, that we would benefit from his consideration of these
issues in the first instance.”136
Subsequently, on remand, Judge Keenan wrote a detailed opinion of
whether the plaintiffs had a claim on this front.137 This time around, the
plaintiffs also made an additional request. Knowing that Judge Keenan
believed that Indian law ought to govern this dispute, they asked that
the laws of their home jurisdiction be used by Judge Keenan, in his court,
to decide this matter, for which there was precedent.138 As their amended
complaint argued, while Indian law was satisfactory on paper, Indian
courts simply did not execute well enough on providing adequate
remedies—like the American federal courts historically had.139

what the plaintiffs were saying was that because there were criminal investigations
pending against Union Carbide in India, which needed to be resolved completely, the
company ought to be prevented from moving to dismiss the claims being brought by the
plaintiffs in the United States. See id. at *7. The court, however, disagreed and said that
the only case it could concern itself with was the civil, tort-based case. See id. The fact that
there may or may not be a criminal case against Union Carbide (in a foreign jurisdiction,
no less) was immaterial for the case at bar (Union Carbide and Warren Anderson refused
to consent or acknowledge that they could be subject to criminal prosecution in India). Id.
at *8. As the primary support for its holding, the court cited Degen v. United States. Id. at
*6–8 (citing 517 U.S. 820 (1996)). For a critical evaluation of Bano v. Union Carbide,
including a rebuke from one of the plaintiffs’ lawyers (H. Rajan Sharma) who critiqued the
Indian Government’s failure to represent the victims in a zealous fashion, see C. Raj Kumar
& Pratibha Jain, Last Chance to Render Justice to Bhopal Victims, HINDU (Dec. 13, 2000),
https://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2000/12/13/stories/05131349.htm.
132. Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 120 (2d Cir. 2001).
133. Id. at 122.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 133. For a contemporaneous piece that was written with optimism that the
Second Circuit’s ruling would bring about much-needed justice for the victims, see C. Raj
Kumar, Bhopal Victims’ Legal Victory, HINDU (Dec. 11, 2001), https://www.thehindu.com/
thehindu/op/2001/12/11/stories/2001121100040100.htm.
137. Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 99 Civ.11329 JFK, 2003 WL 1344884, at *3-9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2003).
138. Id. at *3.
139. Id.
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Judge Keenan was not impressed by either the original or new claim.
He saw the latter change in course to be purely instrumental. New York
law, which otherwise could have applied to sue on a harm that occurred
outside the United States, had a statute of limitations that had lapsed,
he held.140 To argue that Indian law now needed to be employed by an
American court was simply an end run. Furthermore, he was unwilling
to forget that the plaintiffs’ original complaint had bemoaned Indian law
as being insufficient and that these types of inconsistent “pleading
defects cannot be tolerated . . . in such lengthy and extensive
litigation.”141 Consequently, he dismissed the case for lack of timeliness,
as well as reaffirmed his previous decision on the environmental claims
for why this case could not continue.142
Once again, the plaintiffs asked the Second Circuit to review the
case.143 And again, the appellate court sent the matter back to Judge
Keenan.144 In their appeal, the plaintiffs argued that Judge Keenan’s
statute of limitations interpretation of the New York law was too
sweeping and did not distinguish between their property damage and
personal injury claims against the defendants.145 The Second Circuit
agreed and asked Judge Keenan to consider whether the plaintiffs could
proceed, in particular, with the property damage claim as a class
action.146
Judge Keenan, upon a rehearing, refused to grant class certification.
Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he found that the
140. Id. at *4–6.
141. Id. at *3.
142. Id. at *9. These reaffirmed principles included the following: first, one of the main
plaintiffs, Haseena Bi, argued that because her injuries were patent, the New York law
provided an exemption to its firm statute of limitations. Id. at *4. The court held otherwise.
Id. at *5. In addition, she and the others sought to recover for property damage that they
attributed to Union Carbide’s actions. Id. at *6. There too, the court rejected this complaint
as “nonsensical.” Id. The plaintiffs also contended that Union Carbide and Anderson
engaged in fraud and deception in covering up their actions, which resulted in the plaintiffs’
injuries (both personal and property). Id. The court found no evidence of such behavior and,
in fact, went further to hold that Union Carbide had built an adequate hospital and had
“met its obligations to clean up the contamination in and near the Bhopal plant.” Id. at *9.
And finally, the court continued to state that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the
proper venue to litigate all of these types of matters should be in India and not in the United
States. Id. at *8.
143. See Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696 (2d Cir. 2004).
144. Id. at 717.
145. Id. at 706.
146. Id. at 702, 713. The appellate court also appeared persuaded by third party reports
indicating that Bi’s discovery of the property damage occurred later in time, which, if true,
would have allowed her to bring forth her claim within New York’s statutory period, thus
vitiating the argument that she had not been timely in filing this cause of action against
Union Carbide and Anderson. Id. at 712–13.
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plaintiffs did not have the financial wherewithal to proceed as a class.147
Moreover, the property claim was based on the damage caused to an
aquifer that was affecting the entire Bhopal community, rather than to
individually owned personal property, which, according to the judge,
negated the right to proceed. Finally, he refused to reverse his earlier
dismissal, noting that he could not “allow [the p]laintiffs to intervene in
or to certify a class for a claim that was [already properly] dismissed.”148
This last ruling put a final end to the Sajida Bano case. The Second
Circuit did not contest Judge Keenan’s decision and the matter was
closed. These plaintiffs encountered a similar fate to the earlier litigants
of the 1980s and 1990s. Even though this case was supposed to have been
evaluated independently on its own merits, Judge Keenan’s reasons for
repeatedly granting the defendants’ various motions to dismiss were
clearly tied to the MDL. Over the ensuing decade, a similar trend
emerged in a subsequent case.
B. The Sahu Case(s)
Beginning in 2005, a second group of plaintiffs, led by a victim of the
disaster, Janki Bai Sahu, brought a series of new claims against Union
Carbide and Warren Anderson.149 This class of petitioners sought to show
that the parent company could be held liable in the United States for the
tortious actions of its Indian subsidiary.150 Specifically, the plaintiffs
complained that there had not been sufficient medical monitoring of
those who had suffered injury, nor was there adequate remediation.151
Judge Keenan began this discussion by bluntly stating that he “could
dismiss all of [the p]laintiffs’ claims based on forum non conveniens.”152
The reason was simple: there were many similarities between this matter
and the first Bhopal case from 1986. However, because this was a
separate situation, Judge Keenan noted that it demanded an analysis of
the “[p]laintiffs’ claims based on the merits.”153 On its face, this statement
might have offered hope for the claimants that they would be receiving a
fresh take on their case—one unsaddled by the influences of previous
rulings. Yet, such optimism was dashed almost immediately thereafter.

147. Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11329 (JFK), 2005 WL 2464589, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2005) (“Rule 23(a)(4) allows certification only if ‘the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.’”).
148. Id. at *4.
149. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 407, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
150. Id. at 408–09.
151. Id. at 409, 411.
152. Id. at 410.
153. Id.
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For example, throughout the substance of his opinion, Judge Keenan
repeatedly referenced his previous rulings in the Sajida Bano and MDL
cases.154 Regarding Bano, he pointed out that he had already decided that
providing relief on the claims of medical monitoring and remediation
were “infeasible.”155 He further held—similar to what he decided before
in the MDL matter—that the connection between Union Carbide-U.S.
and Union Carbide-India was too tenuous. They did not act as “joint
tortfeasors,”156 nor did they act in a nefarious manner with one another
to commit an intentional tort. Judge Keenan also found no evidence that
there was any duplicitous behavior on the part of Anderson or any Union
Carbide official to cause the accident or perpetuate the harms that had
been continuing.157 But as he concluded his opinion, Judge Keenan did
offer one relatively modest accommodation for the plaintiffs: he granted
them a stay so that they could have more time to engage in further
discovery for a possible claim of corporate veil piercing.158
Following this decision, the litigation took on a dizzying set of turns.
The plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Second Circuit. Before a decision was
made by the appellate court, though, Judge Keenan ruled on the
corporate veil piercing motion in November of 2006. He issued a
dismissal opinion that forcefully ended with this line: “This case is closed,
and the Court directs the Clerk to remove the case from the Court’s
docket.”159
Yet, the case in fact was not closed. In 2008, the Second Circuit
remanded the entire matter back to Judge Keenan’s court, holding that
he had too summarily evaluated the evidence amassed by the plaintiffs
and had not given them enough time to reply to the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.160 Meanwhile, the previous year (2007), a second
set of plaintiffs (some of whom were the same as the plaintiffs in the first
Sahu case) had filed a parallel case against Union Carbide and Anderson,
and added to the list the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, which had

154. Id. at 411.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 412–13.
157. Id. at 412–15.
158. Id. at 415–16.
159. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 04 Civ. 8825 (JFK), 2006 WL 3377577, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2006).
160. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 548 F.3d 59, 67–70 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Sahu III”).
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taken over the Bhopal facility.161 This case came to be known as Sahu
II.162
On remand regarding Sahu I, there were separate but related
hearings that took place during 2010. Two of these matters involved the
plaintiffs asking for more time for discovery and for compelling the
defendants to turn-over additional documents. Judge Keenan denied
both these requests.163 In another one of the hearings, the plaintiffs
boldly asked Judge Keenan to recuse himself from any further
deliberations and to assign the case to a different judge.164 Their position
was clear: Judge Keenan was too wedded to his earlier decisions, which
made it impossible for him to consider new Bhopal-based evidence in an
impartial manner.165 They also asserted that he had made statements in
his previous rulings that demonstrated hostility to the plaintiffs’ claims
and that, in order to preserve the appearance of justice, it was only fair
that another unbiased judge preside in matters going forward.166
Unremarkably, Judge Keenan was not convinced. He rebutted each
of these points with what he argued were perfectly and rationally legal
reasons for his past rulings. He also noted that not once had the Second
Circuit commented on his lack of fairness or impartiality. He thereafter
dismissed the motion.167
By 2012, the defendants (Union Carbide and Warren Anderson)
sought summary judgment to dismiss the entire Sahu I case in their
favor.168 Judge Keenan agreed, holding that neither the American

161. The group, EarthRights International, has been the leading organization to bring
these cases to the U.S. federal courts. The organization’s website has a detailed history and
timeline of its involvement in these matters. See Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS,
https://earthrights.org/case/sahu-v-union-carbide/#timelineff69-1a905f26-f4b6 (“In addition to EarthRights International (ERI), counsel for the plaintiffs have included Sharma &
DeYoung LLP, Curtis V. Trinko, Hausfeld LLP, and Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.
EarthRights International has worked closely with the International Campaign for Justice
in Bhopal and the Bhopal Group for Information and Action to pursue justice for Bhopal
communities.”).
162. Id.; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 475 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(“Sahu II”).
163. Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 04 Civ. 8825 (JFK), 2010 WL 909074, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010); see also Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 746 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161.
164. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 04 Civ. 8825 (JFK), 2010 WL 532307, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2010).
165. Id. at *2.
166. Id. at *3–5.
167. Id. at *1.
168. Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 04 Civ. 8825 (JFK), 2012 WL 2422757, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2012); see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161.
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company nor its CEO were liable as tortfeasors.169 They were not
responsible for the environmental degradation and pollution that
occurred in the aftermath of the leak and there was not enough of a nexus
between Union Carbide-India and its American parent company to
justify piercing the corporate veil.170 Referring to the tactics of the
plaintiffs’ lawyers as an “expedition worthy of Vasco da Gama,”171 Judge
Keenan granted the defendants’ motion.172
A year later, the Second Circuit affirmed this decision, bringing to a
close the Sahu I litigation.173 In 2014, the plaintiffs in Sahu II saw their
hopes of recovery end as well.174 On similar grounds, Judge Keenan
granted summary judgment to the defendants.175 After a petition to the
Second Circuit was denied and the appeals process for this case was
exhausted, the Bhopal jurisprudence in the federal courts was over by
2016.176 The various claimants who had come before Judge Keenan in
nearly thirty years of hearings had ultimately failed to prevail in having
even one single complaint heard by a trier of fact. The next Part critically
examines this sad reality and analyzes whether justice was served, both
procedurally and substantively.
IV. HOW JUDGE KEENAN RECEIVED THE BHOPAL CASES AND THE
RATIONALE OF HIS RULINGS
A. The Process Angle
The introductory section of this Article discussed how the federal
district court in the SDNY adheres to the “related cases rule.”177 As
Professor Macfarlane’s analysis has shown, this rule gives deference to
169. See Sahu, 2012 WL 2422757, at *1; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS,
supra note 161.
170. See Sahu, 2012 WL 2422757, at *20–23; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide,
EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161.
171. Sahu, 2012 WL 2422757, at *2; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS,
supra note 161.
172. Sahu, 2012 WL 2422757, at *23; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS,
supra note 161.
173. Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 528 F. App’x 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Sahu v.
Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161.
174. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 07 Civ. 2156 (JFK), 2014 WL 3765556, at *18
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014); see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161.
175. Sahu, 2014 WL 3765556, at *18; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS,
supra note 161. Note, here the defendants in this case were Union Carbide and the State of
Madhya Pradesh because by this time they had taken title to the Union Carbide-India
facility.
176. See Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161.
177. See text accompanying notes 16–22.
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judges who wish to hear present and future cases connected in subject
matter to earlier ones that they have adjudicated.178 The lessons provided
by Professor Macfarlane apply here as well.179 Namely, Judge Keenan
had heard the first Bhopal case in 1986, and, thereafter, his colleagues
on the bench were willing to defer to him on all subsequent, Bhopalrelated matters for the next thirty years.
One intellectually akin antecedent for having the related cases rule
in effect can be traced back to the work of Max Weber. In classic Weberian
tradition, in order to arrive at truth and a normatively positive outcome
in a given situation, specialization of the investigator was key.180 The
idea was simple: specialization resulted in the more efficient use of time
and resources. Moreover, a specialist’s expertise offered legitimacy for
any decisions eventually rendered.181 For Weber, what might be
described as “cool, detached rationality” needed to pervade the decisionmaking process, and those who had highly technical skill sets were in the
best position to accomplish this objective.182
On its face, it might seem completely reasonable that Judge Keenan
would be the natural jurist to hear the thirty years of litigation on
Bhopal. He had the most familiarity with the original case, as well as the
subsequent MDL matters that came before him. Furthermore, Judge
Keenan has been widely admired within the SDNY. As Michael
Armstrong, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney recently noted, “I do not
know of another judge who is as uniformly liked as he is” and that “[o]n
anyone’s list of the best three judges in the Southern District of New York
at any time over the past 25 years, John Keenan is going to be one of
178. See Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 203.
179. Id.
180. See MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 135–36 (H.H. Gerth &
C. Wright Mills eds., 2009).
181. See also id.
182. Note Weber contrasted this approach with what he called “Kadi justice,” or
informal, capricious decisions made by adjudicators who dressed up their judgments in
language of “concrete ethical standards.” In reality, these Kadi-type judgments “lack[ed]
definitive criteria,” which Weber found to be an unacceptable method of decision-making.
See Susan Hekman, The Epistemology of Moral Voice: Displacing Hegemony in Moral/
Legal Discourse, in ENGENDERING RATIONALES 291–93 (Nancy Tuana & Sandra Morgen
eds., 2001). There have been critics of Weber on this point, who argue that he did not have
a firm grasp of how Kadi justice operated in Islamic societies. See e.g., Asifa Quaraishi, On
Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi Helps Me Understand American
Constitutional Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 339, 339 n.1; Joyce S. Sterling & Wilbert E.
Moore, Weber’s Analysis of Legal Rationalization: A Critique and Constructive Modification,
2 SOC. F. 67, 73–74 (1987). See generally LEON SHASKOLSKY SHELEFF, SOCIAL COHESION
AND LEGAL COERCION: A CRITIQUE OF WEBER, DURKHEIM, AND MARX (1997); David
Schneiderman, Judging in Secular Times: Max Weber and the Rise of Proportionality, 63
SUP. CT. L. REV. 557, 564–65 (2013).
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them.”183 Michael Martin, a faculty member at Fordham (Judge Keenan’s
alma mater) has remarked that he “is the epitome of all that a judge
should be . . . [including] [h]is commitment to serving the public and his
dedication to ethical principles.”184 And Robert Fiske, a former U.S.
Attorney of the SDNY (1976–80) and now senior counsel at Davis Polk,
has stated that, regarding the Bhopal case, Judge Keenan “handled it
beautifully.”185
Of course, the last comment by Fiske does not mention that in reality
there was not just one Bhopal matter that Judge Keenan heard.
Nevertheless, given that he had acquired international recognition after
that first case in 1986—along with the fact that he possessed this
enormous social capital—if any judge were to have the related case rule
apply, it would be Judge Keenan. His deep knowledge of the initial
Bhopal case made him, in Weberian terms, a specialist who could provide
rational, nuanced, and objective guidance for subsequent parties in
future matters relating to the chemical disaster. Recall, the whole idea of
the MDL statute was to consolidate and make more efficient, for the
federal court system, similarly situated cases that spanned the different
federal courts.186 The judge assigned to hear these consolidated matters
was charged with supervising discovery and all pre-trial motions. The
judge also had the power to promote settlements—but also to dismiss the
case if it was found to have no merit. Where neither occurred, the case
was to be remanded to the court where the claim was originally filed.187
Several scholars have studied the MDL process in great detail.
Notably, in recent years, Professor Andrew Bradt has been arguably the
most prominent researcher examining the operation of the MDL system
and how it came into existence.188 As he demonstrates, the original goal
of a “small group of scholars and judges that invented MDL and
183. See Ross Galin, Hon. John F. Keenan: U.S. District Judge for the Southern District
of New York, FED. L., June 2016, at 21 (2016), https://news.law.fordham.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/KeenanFederalLawyerProfile.pdf.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 23; Robert B. Fiske, Jr., DAVIS POLK, davispolk.com/profesionals/Robertfiske (last visited Mar. 4, 2020). Also see another quote from U.S. Magistrate Judge Leda
Wettre, who stated that “Judge Keenan is one of the most talented—yet most humble—
people I know . . . . All of his former clerks have tried to emulate him. None of us will ever
achieve that combination of intelligence, humor, common sense, and compassion that
makes him so special, but we are all better lawyers and people for having tried.” Galin,
supra note 183, at 26.
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018).
187. Id.
188. See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of
1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831 (2017); Andrew D. Bradt and D. Theodore Rave, The
Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1259
(2017).
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shepherded it to enactment” was straightforward.189 These advocates
engaged in “an intentional power grab” to stem what they perceived to be
an oncoming wave of mass tort litigation.190 This group acted
strategically. They feared that parties and lawyers, and even some
sympathetic individual judges, around the country would actively use
mass tort litigation as a vehicle to advance social policy and, in the
process, gridlock the federal courts. As a result, Professor Bradt explains
that the 1968 legislation was crafted so that “[c]ontrol of these cases . . .
[was] centralized in the hands of a single and active judge—specifically a
judge committed to strong pretrial case management who would direct
the conduct of the nationwide litigation from the bench.”191
Given this history, Judge Keenan, it would seem, was simply
adhering to the intent of the statute’s drafters when deciding the
subsequent MDL matters that occurred after the initial 1986 case. The
twist in this story though is that after 1993, the different Bhopal matters
that occupied Judge Keenan’s docket were not part of the MDL. Rather,
they were separate. What appears to have occurred, however, is that the
MDL process created a type of path dependence for all the Bhopal
matters that came into the federal courts. Even though these later cases
were not part of the original MDL, they were effectively treated as such.
Judge Keenan was deemed the expert, and with the related cases rule in
place, he received deference from his federal court colleagues that he
should be the one to preside over these later matters.
It is interesting to note this connection between MDL and the related
cases rule. The federal courts literature discusses these concepts in
important ways. There is the aforementioned work by scholars such as
Professors Bradt and Macfarlane, respectively. Regarding the MDL, in
particular, others too have written on it from significant perspectives.192
189. Bradt, supra note 188, at 834, 838–39 (noting that the main proponents were
federal district court Judge William Becker from Missouri, Dean Phil Neal of the University
of Chicago Law School, Chief Judge Alfred Murrah of the Tenth Circuit, and federal district
court Judge Edwin Robinson from Illinois).
190. Id. at 907.
191. Id. at 839.
192. For other key works by Bradt in this area, see Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore
Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of
Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251 (2018); Andrew D. Bradt & Zachary D. Clopton,
MDL v. Trump: The Puzzle of Public Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 112 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 85 (2018); Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1165 (2018). As stated, the Columbia Law Review also has been active in
publishing pieces on MDL. See supra note 15; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE, 132–55 (2015); Robert G.
Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155
(2006); Bradt, supra note 188; Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 513 (1996); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
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By examining how the series of Bhopal cases has transpired over the
years, this Article builds upon this past literature by showing that the
MDL system, in fact, can also influence how distinct, separate, non-MDL
matters are still funneled into that same judge’s docket. But there are
serious consequences to this reality, which should cause concern for those
who have argued that judicial efficiency and judicial expertise justify
eschewing the randomized selection of judges in the docket-setting
process.
B. Substantive Concerns with the Rulings Themselves
1.

Returning to the 1986 Forum Non Conveniens Case

Much of the first part of Judge Keenan’s 1986 forum non conveniens
ruling was premised on the belief that the Indian experts hired by Union
Carbide had more credibility than the plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Marc
Galanter. However, rather than providing data, empirics, or metrics, the
two experts from the Union Carbide side offered only their professional
opinion based on their own experiences as Senior Advocates in India.193

Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1507 (2008); Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017); Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The
Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2017); Howard M. Erichson, What MDL and
Class Actions Have in Common, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 29 (2017); Abbe R. Gluck,
Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook
Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669 (2017); Deborah R. Hensler, The Role
of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L.
REV. 883, 886–87 (2001); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80
U. CIN. L. REV. 389 (2011); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 29–35 (1991); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex
Litigation If a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205 (2008); Charles Silver &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations:
Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 108–10 (2010); Margaret S. Thomas,
Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 EMORY L.J. 1339,
1341 (2014); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 798
(2010). For a non-MDL piece that nevertheless discusses the influence that judges can have
on an area of the law if they are able to have a “dominating [effect on] the development of”
that law, see Margaret V. Sachs, Superstar Judges as Entrepreneurs: The Untold Story of
Fraud-on-the Market, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1213 (2015).
193. See Aff. of N.A. Palkhivala in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss on Forum Non
Conveniens Grounds, In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in
December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (1986) (No. 21-38) (on file with author); Aff. of J.B.
Dadachanji in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds, In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp.
842 (1986) (No. 21-38) (on file with author). The term Senior Advocate refers to the highest
level of courtroom litigator in India. It is parallel to a Queen’s Council barrister in the U.K.
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To be sure, their reputations within the Indian legal profession were
stellar. Nanabhoy (Nani) Palkhivala (1920–2002) was a historically
important lawyer in India. A constitutional expert, prominent rights
activist, leading economist, and former Ambassador to the United States,
Palkhivala was regarded as one of India’s best litigators in the postindependence era.194 J.B. Dadachanji (1921–2007) too was an
accomplished lawyer in his own right. Working both in the Indian
Supreme Court and in the corporate law firm sector, Dadachanji
established himself as one of India’s great business lawyers during the
twentieth century.195
That said, their respective declarations read as though they were
personally offended that an individual they saw as an outsider would
have the temerity to criticize the system in which they worked.196 For
example, Palkhivala viewed Professor Galanter’s assessment—that the
Indian legal system had structural problems in delivering tort remedies
to victims—as “slanderous” and “unredeemable” as well as “inapt,”
“untenable,” and “ludicrous.”197 Dadachanji, in his short statement, used
the word “incorrect” eleven times in rebutting Professor Galanter’s
contention.198 He also proclaimed that Professor Galanter’s affidavit
“libel[ed] the Indian Courts, the Indian bar and the Indian legal system”
and that such skepticism about the Indian judiciary was “inappropriate
and callous.”199 Returning to Palkhivala, he believed that since “[t]he
claimants ha[d] no less a champion than the sovereign Union
Government,”200 the Indian judiciary would clearly make this case a

194. See Aff. of Palkhivala, supra note 193, at 222–23; see also M.V. KAMATH, NANI A.
PALKHIVALA – A LIFE (2012); SOLI J. SORABJEE & ARVIND P. DATAR, NANI PALKHIVALA: THE
COURTROOM GENIUS (2012).
195. See Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 193, at 72.
196. Id.; see also Aff. of Palkhivala, supra note 193, at 223. Note, Professor Marc
Galanter’s affidavit for the plaintiffs alone was over 220 pages, compared to the sworn
statements of Palkhivala and Dadachanji that were, respectively, eight and thirteen pages.
197. See Aff. of Palkhivala, supra note 193, at 226, 228.
198. See Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 193, at 76–77, 80–82, 84.
199. Id. at 74, 79.
200. See Aff. of Palkhavia, supra note 193, at 228; see also Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note
193, at 78–79 (“Delay is a problem only in routine cases and not in the present type of
litigation. The importance of and interest in the present litigation is apparent from the fact
that the Parliament has put the Government in place of the citizens by enacting The Bhopal
Gas Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985. This shows that the Government itself
regards the present litigation as a matter of major public interest. It has, pursuant to the
Bhopal Act, acted for all claimants in the United States. and it could do so in India as well.
As the sovereign, the Government has the power to remedy all of the supposed problems
mentioned in the Galanter affidavit, such as the facilities and staff made available to
Judges to help them in their work.”).
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priority, thereby quelling any worry that the matter would languish in
the courts for an unreasonable period of time.
Both advocates also noted that, if need be, the government could
establish “Special Tribunals” to handle this case.201 Such a practice was
routine in other high-profile cases in order to expedite claims. And they
lauded the Indian courts for being creative, innovative, and able to grasp
the complexities demanded by both sides. In particular, Dadachanji’s
affidavit noted that the Indian judiciary had repeatedly demonstrated its
sophisticated nature through its various landmark decisions.202
These declarations notwithstanding, in actuality, research has long
shown that the Indian courts struggle with delay, backlog, and the
enforcement of arrears.203 In addition, the idea that the government’s
representation of the plaintiffs necessarily would result in a quicker
completion of the case failed to recognize the reality of events. To begin,
the main assets of Union Carbide were located in the United States. The
Indian government would first need to obtain a favorable ruling from the
Indian courts and then take that judgment to a federal court in the
United States for enforcement to collect damages.204
201. See Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 193, at 81; Aff. of Palkhivala, supra note 193, at
228.
202. See Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 193, at 74–76. Both experts provided other
sweeping statements and rhetorical anecdotes. Aff. of Palkhivala, supra note 193, at 224,
228 (“The Indian judiciary is wholly competent to deal with any dispute in any field of law,
and has, in the 35 years of the history of our Republic, ably dealt with far more complex
issues than those arising from the gas plant disaster at Bhopal. . . . The Bhopal Act [which
allowed the government to represent the plaintiffs] by itself is wholly sufficient to insulate
[the] Bhopal claimants from the law’s proverbial delays. There is no ‘inadequacy’ or
‘deficiency’ in the Indian legal system which cannot be set right by the Government of India
within a matter of days.”); Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 193, at 77 (“It is further incorrect
to say that Judges do not promote settlement in India. In fact, in recent years in my
experience, there have been more settlements promoted by Judges. . . . Undoubtedly, the
sophistication of Indian System causes some delay in administration of justice. However,
the delay can be and has been overcome by Courts in matters involving substantial
questions which are of great public importance.” (emphasis added)).
203. For studies that have discussed this point, see Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 53,
at 789; Krishnan & Thomas, supra note 53, at 340; Krishnan et al., supra note 53, at 179.
204. For a discussion of foreign parties seeking to use U.S. courts, see Hannah L.
Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and the Case Against “Judicial
Imperialism,” 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 675, 693, 697 (2016) (referencing briefly the
Bhopal case and the concerns of the Indian government in pursuing the case in the Indian
courts); Hanlon & Hoffman, supra note 43, at 41; S.I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. 45, 70–71
(2014); Nadja Vietz, Recognition of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts, HARRIS BRICKEN
(Nov. 9, 2018), https://harrisbricken.com/blog/recognition-foreign-judgments-us-courts/.
For a piece that looks at how domestic laws try to bring about resolution in transnational
disputes, see Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93
MINN. L. REV. 815, 820, 833 (2009). For another study looking at the influx of transnational
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The problem, however, was with the structural framework of India’s
judicial system. Dating back to colonial times, India’s civil procedure code
has provided lawyers with various interlocutory appeals, which they
have frequently and successfully used to delay cases from being
completed.205 Union Carbide, with its expert Indian lawyers, would likely
have employed these same tactics in order to have prevented a quick
disposition of the case.
Furthermore, with respect to Palkhivala and Dadachanji’s
suggestion that a special or “fast-track” tribunal could be established to
expedite the process, research has found that many of the ills that plague
the regular court system in India often migrate to alternative forums,
with the result being delays and serious questions about the quality of
justice being delivered within these supposedly faster settings.206
Relatedly, India suffers from enormous judicial vacancies so that,
frequently, overburdened judges in the regular courts are asked to sit in
specialized forums, which only compounds their workload and results in
delays now in two different venues.207 And even if an Indian court
(regular or fast-track) eventually issued a favorable judgment to the
plaintiffs, it would be easy to imagine Union Carbide proffering some
type of lack of due process argument in the U.S. courts during the
enforcement stage.208 There thus would be the potential for Union
cases at the U.S. Supreme Court, see Austen L. Parrish, Personal Jurisdiction: The
Transnational Difference, 59 VA. J. OF INT’L. L. 97, 99, 122 (2019).
205. For studies that have discussed this point, see Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 53,
at 789; Krishnan & Thomas, supra note 53, at 351; Krishnan et al., supra note 53, at 178–
79.
206. See Upendra Baxi & Marc Galanter, Panchayat Justice: An Indian Experiment in
Legal Access, in 3 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 377–80 (Mauro
Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1979); R. KUSHAWAHA, WORKING OF NYAYA PANCHAYATS
IN INDIA 2 (1977); S.N. MATHUR, NYAYA PANCHAYATS AS INSTRUMENTS OF JUSTICE 43–77
(1997); Catherine S. Meschievitz & Marc Galanter, In Search of Nyaya Panchayats: The
Politics of a Moribund Institution, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE
STUDIES 65 (Richard Abel ed., 1982); Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 53, at 789–90;
Krishnan & Thomas, supra note 53, at 340; Krishnan et al., supra note 53, at 180; Gene
Kassebaum, Lok Adalat: A State Sponsored Alternative to Court Litigation of Personal
Injury, Other Civil and Criminal Cases in South India 5 (1989) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author); Catherine S. Meschievitz, Panchayat Justice: State-Sponsored
Informal Courts in 19th and 20th Century India, Disputes Processing Research Program
(Inst. for Legal Studies, Working Paper 8:1, 1987).
207. See Baxi & Galanter, supra note 206; KUSHAWAHA, supra note 206; MATHUR, supra
note 206; Kassebaum, supra note 206; Krishnan et al., supra note 53, at 180; Meschievitz,
supra note 206.
208. In fact, a roughly analogous situation has played out with respect to the Chevron
Corporation’s litigation in Ecuador. See Karan Nagarkatti & Gary McWilliams,
International Tribunal Rules in Favor of Chevron in Ecuador Case, REUTERS (Sept. 7,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chevron-ecuador/international-tribunal-rules-in-
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Carbide to tie up litigation in both the Indian courts and American courts
for a long period of time.209
And finally, there were the claims relating to India’s legal profession.
Palkhivala and Dadachanji vigorously argued that there was no shortage
of Indian lawyers capable of handling this case. But this assertion was
belied by the empirical reality that, historically, most lawyers in the
country were individual litigators who worked primarily on petty civil
and criminal matters, with many struggling even to eke out an
existence.210 Research done since that period illustrates that while there
has been a growth in the corporate bar as well as of law firms engaging
in more global transactions—especially since the liberalization of India’s
favor-of-chevron-in-ecuador-case-idUSKCN1LN1WS. Between the mid-1960s and the early
1990s, the American company, Texaco, operated in Ecuador. Id. A group of Ecuadorian
villagers/plaintiffs brought suit against Texaco claiming a number of environmental
violations and ecological abuses by the company. Id. In 1998, an agreement was struck
between Texaco and the Ecuadorian government, whereby the former paid some $40 million
for what would be cleanup costs. Id. In 2001, Chevron bought Texaco. Id. Subsequently, a
class action, toxic tort suit was brought against Chevron, and in 2011 an Ecuadorian court
ruled that Chevron owed damages in the amount of $18 billion. Id. That amount was later
reduced to $9.5 billion on appeal. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiffs sought to enforce the
judgment in the United States, but Chevron opposed this motion on numerous grounds. Id.
One of the successful defenses involved claiming that the 2011 judgment was procured
through fraud and corruption and that the American attorneys had acted corruptly as well.
Id. One such lawyer has, in fact, since been disbarred by the state of New York. Id. Although
in 2018 the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court affirmed the $9.5 billion award, in September
of 2018 an international tribunal operated out of the Hague disallowed that judgment,
holding that the 1998 settlement cleared Chevron and noting that the award granted in
Ecuador “was procured through fraud, bribery and corruption and was based on claims that
had been already settled and released by the Republic of Ecuador years earlier.” Id.
209. Then there is the issue of judgments from the courts being translated into tangible
remedies for claimants. While Palkhivala and Dadachanji rightly noted that the Indian
judiciary (particularly the Supreme Court) has been robust at times in protecting the rights
of the harmed on paper, an impressive literature has documented how frequently the effects
of these rulings are neither felt at the community nor the individual level. For studies that
have discussed this point, see, e.g., ROBERT MOOG, WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SUPREME:
ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS IN THE CIVIL COURTS IN INDIA 135–46 (1997); Carl Baar, Social
Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limitations of the World’s Most Active
Judiciary, 19 POL’Y STUD. J. 140 (1990); P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public
Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 561, 561 (1985); Rajeev Dhavan, Law as
Struggle: Public Interest Law in India, 36 J. INDIAN L. INST. 302, 305–06 (1994); Galanter
& Krishnan, supra note 53, at 797; Krishnan & Thomas, supra note 53, at 342; Krishnan
et al., supra note 53, at 181. Even with respect to the $470 million settlement that the
Indian Supreme Court approved, there still remain countless victims who have not received
what they were due. See Alys Francis, Why Are Bhopal Survivors Still Fighting for
Compensation?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india30205140.
210. Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the
Ford Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
447, 468 (2004).
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economy in 1991—the high prevalence of solo practitioners with limited
resources and skill sets remains to this day.211
Yet, none of these points were acknowledged by Palkhivala or
Dadachanji in their sworn statements. More disheartening was the fact
that even though the plaintiffs, under the Gilbert and Piper Aircraft
tests, had sound arguments for why the case ought to be heard in the
United States, Judge Keenan still opted to rule that the Indian judiciary
was not just an adequate forum but that it was superior to its American
counterpart—a curious conclusion, given the mountain of evidence
pointing in the other direction.
2.

Other Concerns with the Later MDL Rulings

Recall that in the 1989 MDL case—where Judge Keenan had
originally praised the plaintiffs’ lawyers for their good work in trying to
secure justice for the Bhopal victims—he nevertheless concluded that the
U.S. courts were “without jurisdiction to award the [lawyers]
compensation under section 475 of the New York Judiciary Law or any
other theory.”212 On that same page of his opinion, Judge Keenan also
quoted the Second Circuit’s judgment affirming his earlier 1986 forum
non conveniens ruling:
Once [the district court] dismisses the United States proceedings
on grounds of forum non conveniens it ceases to have any further
jurisdiction over the matter unless and until a proceeding may
some day be brought to enforce here a final and conclusive Indian
money judgment.213
How are the final few words of this passage—”to enforce here a final
and conclusive Indian money judgment”—to be interpreted? On its face,
enforcement may simply mean ensuring that the plaintiffs receive
compensation for their suffering. But a logical extension of this point
would also include that the lawyers be compensated for the work that
they did on behalf of the plaintiffs. After all, no one—not Judge Keenan,
the Second Circuit, or the lawyers themselves—had suggested that all of
this advocacy be done pro bono. Granting this proposition then, it seems
curious that the judge would not recognize this fact and adhere to the
spirit of the Second Circuit’s language, which would have permitted the
211. For a study that has discussed this point, see Krishnan & Thomas, supra note 53,
at 349–50.
212. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, in Dec., 1984,
MDL No. 626, No. 21–38 (JFK), 1989 WL 66673, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1989).
213. Id. (emphasis in original).
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plaintiffs’ lawyers to collect their fees because of the “final and
conclusive” nature of the judgment reached between the parties.
Then, in the related 1993 MDL case, where these lawyers returned
to Judge Keenan for reconsideration of this matter, his analysis appears
even more perplexing. This time he criticized the plaintiffs’ lawyers for
failing to raise their compensation demands in front of the Indian
courts.214 But as he well knew, the lawyers could not do so because, at
the time, they were denied visas to enter India.215 He then chastised the
American lawyers for not hiring local Indian lawyers in a timely fashion
to make the case on their behalf to the Indian courts.216 However, the
American lawyers in fact did retain local counsel;217 they were simply
unsuccessful as the Indian courts held that the lawyers had no standing
because of the time that had lapsed between the omnibus settlement and
their petition seeking payment of fees.
When the case returned to Judge Keenan in 1993, he used this exact
rationale—that the lawyers’ “efforts to protect their [interests] were too
little, too late”—as justification for why they could not pursue
enforcement against Union Carbide in the United States.218 Yet, in
reality, there was no statute of limitations problem under the New York
law that they were referencing.219 Seemingly, the conclusion to draw was
that Judge Keenan was determined not to provide the lawyers with a
federal forum in which to proceed.

214. Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster v. Union Carbide Chem. and Plastics Co.,
Nos. M21–38 (JFK), MDL 626, 1993 WL 541230, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 475 (McKinney 2019) (“From the commencement of an action,
special or other proceeding in any court or before any state, municipal or federal
department, except a department of labor, or the service of an answer containing a
counterclaim, or the initiation of any means of alternative dispute resolution including, but
not limited to, mediation or arbitration, or the provision of services in a settlement
negotiation at any stage of the dispute, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon
his or her client’s cause of action, claim or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report,
determination, decision, award, settlement, judgment or final order in his or her client’s
favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may come; and the lien cannot be
affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment, final order or
determination. The court upon the petition of the client or attorney may determine and
enforce the lien.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, as the statute says and even with the
settlement reached in India, the lien would have remained intact, contrary to Judge
Keenan’s assertion that this claim was time-barred.
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3. Concerns with the Later Non-MDL Cases

As the above discussion describes, in the Sajida Bano and Sahu
cases, Judge Keenan heard multiple motions beginning in 2000 that
spanned the next fifteen years. In not one of these matters did he allow
the plaintiffs to proceed to trial. It is true that each of his decisions
withstood appellate scrutiny. The question, however, is whether he was
willing to take into account all of the facts in these later cases so that he
could make fully informed judgments.
Consider one conspicuous instance that highlights this point. In his
2014 ruling dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims in Sahu II, Judge Keenan
opted not to allow what he referred to as “late-breaking declarations”
from key witnesses who stated in sworn affidavits that they could connect
Union Carbide-U.S. to Union Carbide-India’s plant.220 Such a nexus was
crucial for the plaintiffs’ argument because it would then allow them to
assert that the parent company was potentially liable for the actions
conducted by the subsidiary. In particular, they argued that the Bhopal
facility—which had been built under American design plans—was
continuing to pollute the surrounding area well after the 1984 gas leak
and that it had done little to abate this contamination. The two witnesses
were Lucas John Couvaras and T.R. Chauhan. Couvaras was a Union
Carbide-U.S. employee from 1971 through 1981.221 He was charged with
overseeing “the engineering and construction of the [Union CarbideIndia] plant.”222 Importantly, as Couvaras formally declared:
The process design reports for the UCIL [i.e., Union Carbide
India Limited] plant were prepared by [the] UCC [Union Carbide
Corporation]-Technical Center in Charleston, West Virginia. The
reports were reviewed and approved by the Managers of the
various groups who worked on the preparation of these reports
before they were sent to India.223
For his part, Chauhan was a resident of Bhopal who worked as a key
official at the facility where the leak originated.224 He served in this

220. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 07 Civ. 2156, 2014 WL 3765556, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014).
221. See Declaration of Lucas John Couvaras, Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 07 Civ.
2156, 2014 WL 3765556, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Declaration of T.R. Chauan, Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 07 Civ. 2156,
2014 WL 3765556, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014).

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

SPRING 2020

2020] HOW INDIAN VICTIMS FAILED TO GET JUSTICE 743
position from 1975 to 1985.225 He confirmed that Couvaras was the
person in charge of the “detail design and erection of the [Indian]
plant.”226 Furthermore, he claimed that any site inspections and safety
oversight were the responsibility of Couvaras. More broadly, Chauhan
also stated that the technology the Bhopal plant used was always directly
transferred from the parent company’s offices in the United States.227
Both these affidavits provided prima facie evidence that a direct link
existed between Union Carbide-U.S. and Union Carbide-India. Judge
Keenan, however, did not see it this way. He rejected the idea that
Couvaras was a Union Carbide-U.S. employee. Rather, Judge Keenan
found that Couvaras was, for all intents and purposes, exclusively a
Union Carbide-India official. Couvaras’ role as a plant manager fell
under the subsidiary’s ambit; in the company’s annual reports, he was
listed as an employee of the subsidiary and his direct supervisors were
Indian officials in Mumbai.228 In addition, Judge Keenan disregarded
Chauhan’s statements. Compared to the declaration by Ranjit Dutta, a
plant manager at the Bhopal facility who claimed that Couvaras was only
a Union Carbide-India employee, Chauhan’s affidavit offered “no basis”
to support the plaintiffs’ contention.229 From there, Judge Keenan then
disposed of the other submitted causes of action and found that the
perpetuation of the ongoing contamination could not be anything but the
responsibility of Indian company officials.230 In fact, he forcefully stated
(in bolded heading) that: “No Reasonable Juror Could Find for Plaintiffs
on Any of Their Theories.”231
And that is where the question lies. Is it true that this case should
not have proceeded to a jury? For one thing, it was quite remarkable that
Judge Keenan took the word of a third party (Dutta) on the employment
status of Couvaras—over Couvaras himself. As one of the lead lawyers
for the plaintiffs, Marco Simons of EarthRights International bemoaned
after the ruling, “If you ever thought you knew your own employer’s
identity, think again—your testimony on that subject isn’t even really
evidence.”232 The plaintiffs also provided analysis from two renowned
scientific experts who stated that it was inconceivable that the
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 07 Civ. 2156, 2014 WL 3765556, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014).
229. Id. at *9–10.
230. Id. at *7–13.
231. Id. at *10 (emphasis added).
232. See Sahu II, BHOPAL MEDICAL APPEAL, http://www.bhopal.org/sahu-ii/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2020).
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functioning of the Bhopal plant could have operated independently of
Union Carbide-U.S. Yet, Judge Keenan also rejected this evidence out-ofhand. In 2016, the Second Circuit heard the plaintiffs’ appeal.
Interestingly, the appellate court noted that Couvaras “was lent by UCC
to UCIL,” but that he was primarily an employee of the Indian facility.233
The evidentiary connections to the parent company were too tenuous
and, as such, it did not find that Judge Keenan abused his discretion
when dismissing the case.234
However, if the Second Circuit and Judge Keenan could have
different interpretations on this important issue—which is arguably one
of a factual nature—should this then not have come under the purview
of what a jury ought to have heard? If so, perhaps a jury might have found
that a stronger link indeed existed between Union Carbide-U.S. and
Union Carbide-India. The point is that, after nearly thirty years of
Bhopal-based cases coming in front of Judge Keenan, there was little
doubt as to the way he would rule. For this reason alone, the system of
how matters are assigned to judges needs to be reconsidered.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began by referencing Professor Katharine Macfarlane’s
work on the non-randomized selection process of cases in the federal
district court of the SDNY.235 As shown by her research, and then
confirmed by this Bhopal narrative, there is a real question as to whether
the justice being administered by existing protocol best serves the
interest of all parties involved—and, more broadly, the interests of
society at large.
In various places in her article, Professor Macfarlane notes that
opposition to the related case’s rule stems from a justifiable concern that
bias—or even the appearance of it—may set in on the part of the judge.236
It is important not to allow judges who may have a predisposition
towards an issue or subject area to decide which cases they are assigned.
“Drawing an unfavorable judge is fair when it is a matter of luck, and
nothing more.”237
Probing this point further, this final Part briefly explores a particular
area that law and psychology scholars have studied now for some time:
confirmation bias. A few years back, Eyal Peer and Eyal Gamliel
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 650 F. App’x 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 59.
See Macfarlane, supra note 24.
Id. at 207, 227–33, 235–36, 240–42.
Id. at 227.
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published a useful literature review stating that when “people have a
preconception or hypothesis about a given issue, they tend to favor
information that corresponds with their prior beliefs and disregard
evidence pointing to the contrary.”238 This phenomenon can also include
judges and their decision-making.239 Their observation is one that
previous scholars have also noted. Moa Lidén, Minna Gräns, and Peter
Juslin recently found that judges in Sweden who ordered defendants to
be held in pre-trial detention facilities were more likely, because of a
confirmation bias, to subsequently find these defendants guilty.240
Separately, Eric Rassin, Anita Eerland, and Ilse Kuijpers conducted an
experimental study that included judges as part of the respondent
sample. They determined that once an individual is labelled as a primary
suspect in a criminal case, subsequent evidence that is gathered is
considered only if it confirms the original viewpoint.241 Otherwise it is
discarded.242
In reflecting on this point, one question to ask is whether the thirty
years of Bhopal rulings by Judge Keenan might be an example of
confirmation bias.243 Of course, without formal experimentation, it is not
possible to answer this question with certainty. Still, consider that the
matters that came before Judge Keenan were not one single case. Rather
they involved different parties, different issues, and different questions
of law and fact. Furthermore, the later cases in particular were not
238. See Eyal Peer & Eyal Gamliel, Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decisions, 49 CT.
REV. 114, 114–15 (2013).
239. Id. at 115.
240. See Moa Lidén et al., ‘Guilty No Doubt’: Detention Provoking Confirmation Bias in
Judges’ Guilt Assessments and Debiasing Techniques, 25 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 219, 237–
38 (2018).
241. See Eric Rassin et al., Let’s Find the Evidence: An Analogue Study of Confirmation
Bias in Criminal Investigations, 7 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 231,
233 (2010); see also Peer & Gamliel, supra note 238, at 115.
242. See Rassin et al., supra note 241, at 240.
243. This broader, more general phenomenon of confirmation bias has been discussed in
the psychology literature for decades. See JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (4th
ed. 2000); HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas
Gilovich, Dale Griffin, & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982);
RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 6–8 (1980); D.N. Perkins et al., Everyday Reasoning and the Roots of
Intelligence, in INFORMAL REASONING AND EDUCATION 83, 83–106 (James F. Voss, David N.
Perkins, & Judith W. Segal eds., 1991); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 107–88 (1993); Peer & Gamliel, supra note 238, at 115–16; Asher Koriat
et al., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 107 (1980); Raymond S.
Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 175 (1998); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
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related to the MDL, forum non conveniens decision—yet it was that first
judgment and the reiteration of that rationale that appeared repeatedly
throughout Judge Keenan’s three decades of rulings. Put another way,
that initial opinion appears to have strongly shaped Judge Keenan’s
mindset when it came to: how the tragedy unfolded, where the case
should be adjudicated, who should be liable, and how evidence should be
evaluated.
In terms of this last issue, the different types of evidence that were
presented by the different claimants in the later cases did not seem to
make a difference for Judge Keenan. He was unmoved by the subsequent
legal arguments presented, as he continued to rule that an American
court could not be a proper venue for claims against Union Carbide.
Within the scholarly discourse then, Judge Keenan’s behavior might
seem to comport with those theorists who argue that confirmation bias
involves the “seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial
to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”244
In asserting this point, however, it is crucial not to suggest that
Judge Keenan may have engaged in this conduct in a purposive fashion.
Raymond Nickerson, a leading scholar who has studied this subject,
notes that:
[C]onfirmation bias connotes a less explicit, less consciously onesided case-building process. It refers usually to unwitting
selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence. The line
between deliberate selectivity in the use of evidence and
unwitting molding of facts to fit hypotheses or beliefs is a difficult
one to draw in practice, but the distinction is meaningful
conceptually, and confirmation bias has more to do with the latter
than with the former. The assumption that people can and do
engage in case-building unwittingly, without intending to treat
evidence in a biased way or even being aware of doing so, is
fundamental to the concept.245

244. See Nickerson, supra note 243, at 175; see also Birte Enough & Thomas Mussweiler,
Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1535 (2001); Peer & Gamliel, supra note 238, at 116 n.19, 117–18 n.32 (discussing
Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially
Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 113
(1994)); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780 (2001);
Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their
Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 855 (2015).
245. See Nickerson, supra note 243, at 175–76 (emphasis omitted).
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If Nickerson is correct that those who demonstrate confirmation bias
are not doing so in a cognizant fashion, then there is no reason to believe
that Judge Keenan had an intentional predisposition against the various
Bhopal-based plaintiffs. Nonetheless, his rulings certainly had a
pattern—one that negatively affected the different claimants over a three
decade-period. Moreover, the reputation of a judge having this type of
tendency also has the possibility of deterring potential claimants from
pursuing a cause of action for fear that there is no point in doing so.
Professor Marc Galanter was asked by a law firm in the 2000s whether
he would be willing to play a similar role in a new case against Union
Carbide.246 Professor Galanter told the firm that it was futile to try and
bring such a lawsuit so long as Judge Keenan remained as the presiding
judge.247 The firm thereafter decided not to proceed and the claimants’
case was never filed.
To close, in order for plaintiffs, particularly those who are in weaker
positions, to receive a fresh review in federal court, there must be a
different method in how matters are assigned to judges248—especially
after an MDL process has come to an end. Drawing on Professor
Macfarlane’s related cases research, one proposal might be to eliminate
internal courthouse rules that allow for all judges, including those on
246. Telephone Interview with Marc Galanter, Professor Emeritus, University of
Wisconsin-Madison School of Law (Apr. 7, 2019) (discussing his reflections of the Bhopal
tragedy, 35 years later). Although Union Carbide was the party listed in the cases in front
of Judge Keenan during the 2000s, technically speaking, in 2001, Dow Chemical acquired
Union Carbide as part of a merger deal. Dow Completes Merger with Union Carbide, INT’L
CAMPAIGN JUST. BHOPAL (Feb. 6, 2001), https://www.bhopal.net/old_bhopal_web/oldsite/
dow_completes_merger.html.
247. Telephone Interview with Marc Galanter, supra note 246; see also Nityanand
Jayaraman, Justice Compromised, HINDU (July 3, 2012), https://www.thehindu.com/
opinion/op-ed/justice-compromised/article3595349.ec (questioning whether the plaintiffs
could receive an unbiased hearing in front of Judge Keenan after the 2012 ruling).
Interestingly, in 1995, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a federal district court
ruling in an admiralty case that involved whether a matter should be heard in the United
States or in India. The case dealt with a plaintiff-child who was injured on an Indian ship
that was traveling in international waters. Immediately after the injury, the child was
airlifted first to Antigua and then to New York for medical treatment. She and her family
brought suit in New York against the shipping company, but, while the ship was docked in
Philadelphia, the case was transferred to federal court in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. The federal judge there refused to issue a forum non conveniens motion, per
the defendant’s request. The judge held that the affidavits from plaintiffs’ expert witnesses
were convincing as to why the Indian courts were not an adequate forum for hearing this
matter. One of the experts was the prominent Indian corporate lawyer, Shardul Shroff. The
other was Professor Marc Galanter, who made an almost identical set of arguments that he
provided in his affidavit for the 1986 Bhopal case. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed,
except that it ruled that any damages calculated should be done using Indian rupees rather
than U.S. dollars. Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1220 (3d Cir. 1995).
248. See Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 235–37.
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senior status, to pre-select cases and instead simply implement a lottery
system for all assignments.249 Another could be to mandate public
disclosure of all case assignments to all judges, which would cast sunlight
on those who might be seeking to hoard certain matters onto their docket
and, thereby, possibly deter future manipulative behavior.250 And a third
solution could be to “require . . . [a party] to move for the related case
designation and . . . [then allow for] the other party . . . to oppose”251 it.
This last proposal would also require that the matter be handled by a
different judge than the one who is the focus of the motion.252
In sum, the hope is that the research here will prompt interested
observers to reflect on ways to make the MDL and post-MDL processes
more equitable for future litigants in U.S. federal courts.

249. Id. at 235–36.
250. Id. at 236.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 236–37. Or alternatively, the three-judge committee that evaluates related
case requests for active judges could also do the same for senior status judges. Id. at 246.

